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Executive summary 
This CERRE report scrutinises the economic aspects of data portability in the context of the digital 
economy, against a background of legal and technical considerations. In particular, the report looks 
beyond the current requirements of data portability, as provided for by the GDPR. It critically 
assesses whether additional legal requirements, such as a right to continuous access to personal 
data, would provide complementary tools for making the right to portability more effective and for 
establishing an innovative, competitive and fair data ecosystem that benefits all players.  
 
I. The legal dimension: EU regulatory framework on data portability 
 
The current EU legal framework contains a number of rules that encourage or impose the 
portability and the sharing of personal and non-personal data. Some of these rules are 
horizontal. For personal data, they are covered by the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and competition law. For non-personal data, they are covered by the 
Digital Content Directive applicable in a B2C relationship and the Free Flow of Data 
Regulation applicable in a B2B relationship as well as competition law. The others are 
sectoral and impose data sharing or portability. In particular, this includes (i) the financial 
sector, with the Second Payment Service Directive (PSD2), which imposes access to payment 
account data (and which has been completed in the UK through the Open Banking Programme); 
(ii) the automotive sector, with the new Motor Vehicle Regulation imposing access to some vehicle 
data; and (iii) the energy sector, with the new Electricity Directive imposing access to some 
customer data.  
 
The European Data Protection Board (EDBP) notes that the right to portability, according to GDPR 
Article 20, should be interpreted broadly and should cover both volunteered data 
(actively and knowingly provided) and observed data, but not inferred or derived data. 
However, it remains to be seen whether EU judges will embrace such a broad interpretation. If it is 
followed, web tracking and clickstream data should also be covered by the right to portability. 
However, currently these are not routinely included in the data sets that consumers can download 
pursuant to exercising their right to data portability.  
 
Tensions can emerge within the GDPR, as the right to portability of personal data 
promotes the exchange and reuse of data, while its principles - purpose limitation and 
data minimisation – tend to limit data sharing. In practice, this means that these principles 
need to be considered when implementing the right to data portability and need to be articulated 
prior to the porting of the data. Indeed, the EDBP recommends that the data seeker should inform 
the data subjects on the purposes for which the ported data will be processed and on the 
categories of personal data that are adequate, relevant and necessary for these purposes. This will 
help prevent a breach of these purpose limitation and data minimisation principles. Moreover, if the 
data seeker realises that more data than necessary were ported for the required purpose, they will 
have to delete this excess data as quickly as possible to avoid any liability issue.  
 
Some industry stakeholders have raised concerns that data portability may create a liability issue 
if the data is misused by the recipient. The EDBP has also indicated that, insofar as the data 
giver responds to the request for portability, it acts on behalf of the data subject and should not be 
responsible for any later infringement potentially committed by the data recipient. Nevertheless, 
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procedures to ensure that the data actually transmitted matches that whose portability was 
requested, in respect of the purpose limitation and data minimisation principles.  
 
A more contentious issue around data portability arises with requests relating to personal data 
from other data subjects. Article 20(4) of the GDPR provides that the portability right should not 
affect the rights of others. Indeed, while the data subject originating the portability request may 
have given his or her consent to the data seeker, or has concluded a contract with them, this is not 
the case for the other data subjects whose data could be ported as a result of the exercise of this 
right. Therefore, the consent of the other data subjects would be required in order to be able to 
port such data, which significantly complicates consent management. 
 
From the sector-specific provisions on data portability, the PSD2 is the most relevant and 
interesting in the present context. This is because it complements and extends the B2B portability 
right under Article 20.2 of the GDPR by compelling banks (the original controllers) to allow direct 
transmission of the data subjects’ personal banking information to third party providers (payment 
initiation services or account information services). PSD2 goes further than the GDPR because, on 
the one hand it forces the banks to ensure the technical feasibility of this B2B financial account 
data portability, while on the other it makes this portability continuous, as data subjects can 
request personal data at each transaction, facilitated by APIs.  
 
II. The technical dimension 
 
From a technical perspective, we highlight the various data models and formats commonly 
used in the digital economy. These formats can be roughly categorised as structured, semi-
structured and unstructured data. In both the structured and semi-structured cases, file formats 
only specify a syntactic layer on how information is represented. To make sense of it, it is 
necessary to know the schema of the data, i.e. what fields and data attributes exist, and what 
constraints on the data values should be respected. Beyond the syntax (provided by the file 
format), the schema and the constraints (given by the schema annotations, when available), data 
needs to be interpreted with respect to specific semantics, which give meaning to data fields and 
attributes. When data is exchanged between two data controllers using different schemas, it is 
necessary to transform it from one schema to the other, using schema mappings from the source 
to the destination. These schema mappings are, most of the time, hand written by data engineers, 
although there is sometimes the possibility of automated learning from examples. 
 
In almost all cases, the data needs to be (very) efficiently accessible upon request. This is 
true whenever data may be used by the data controller in real-time applications, e.g. for display 
when a web page is accessed. This means any data item of interest needs to be retrievable with a 
latency in the order of one second or less. Although traditional SQL systems remain by far the 
dominant data storage mode, most large technology companies have switched from traditional 
relational database systems to NoSQL systems, which focus on performance, reflecting their 
extreme needs in terms of latency, data volume, or query throughput. In addition to the core data 
storage system, there is also often an additional caching layer that stores responses in the main 
memory in order to react more quickly to common queries. 
 
A web service, or API, is a technical interface for accessing data meant to be used by 
programmes - in particular by third-party software - to introduce novel applications of the data. 
Although there is no requirement to offer such APIs, they are already commonplace, as they allow 
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possibility of monetising richer forms of data access. In order to be used for accessing personal, 
potentially private, data, API use needs to be combined with an access delegation protocol. This 
verifies that the call to the API has been authorised by the user whose data is being accessed. The 
most-commonly used protocol is OAuth 2.0. The output of APIs is usually in the format of JSON 
files, in a wide variety of schemas, with little to no standardisation between companies. 
 
With respect to data transfer, Personal Management Information Systems (PIMSs) act as a 
separate data controller, with direct exchanges from external data controllers to the PIMS. A PIMS 
may also offer the possibility of pushing the data to other data controllers, in this case acting as a 
third party between the source and destination data controllers. The PIMS can initiate API calls, 
control access tokens and implement schema mappings. It is therefore crucial that the user fully 
trusts the PIMS. 
 
Technical solutions for standardised data exchange remain in their infancy. Noteworthy 
projects include Solid and the Data Transfer Project (DTP). The DTP is a technical initiative 
launched in 2018 and is supported by - among others - Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and 
Twitter. The main aim of this initiative is the development of a specification of an open-source 
platform for data transfer. Although these five companies are nominally involved, the project builds 
on Google’s former Data Liberation Front, and Google is by far the main contributor to the DTP 
platform. When compared to other successful open source projects, both Solid and DTP are still at 
an early stage of development and have progressed little recently. 
 
We claim that, in general, there are no strong technical challenges to providing continuous 
pull- or push-based data exports, with limited delay, as long as specific solutions are 
implemented for large, unstructured data sets. The fact that large data controllers provide similar 
(but incomplete) features through APIs means there are no particular obstacles to implementing 
them. However, in order to better exploit exported data, data controllers should aim for greater 
standardisation of data models (e.g. using common RDF schemas). Currently, data exchange 
capabilities are impeded by the problem of schema heterogeneity. However, assuming this problem 
can be resolved (either by standardising the data export models or by manually compiled schema 
mappings), they represent a manageable technical challenge. Data exchange through a trusted 
third-party (as in a PIMS or the DTP where the hosting entity is on a trusted external host) has the 
advantage that there is no need to provide access tokens to the original data controllers. 
 
III. The economic dimension: Impacts of data portability on innovation 
 
From an economic perspective, although data consumption is non-rival, observed user data 
collection (as opposed to volunteered user data) is rival. This is because for key services 
(such as search, or social networking) the market is concentrated with only a few firms able to 
track user activity across the web. Thus, observed data is not ubiquitously available, and it is also 
usually neither feasible nor socially desirable to duplicate the collection of the same observed data. 
This would mean that users would have to conduct the same search, the same post or the same 
purchase on several platforms, leading to even more web trackers being built into the websites 
that we visit. Thus, although rivalry in data collection is not a problem per se, it does provide a 
strong rational for sharing data.  
 
The more prevalent sharing of ‘raw’ user data will likely render the market for data intermediaries - 
which simply acquire and sell raw data, but do not offer further advanced analytics on it - more 






June 2020 – Making data Portability More Effective for The Digital Economy     9/101 
the basis of data-derived insights. Indeed, as raw data becomes more prevalent, the focus of 
competition is likely to move from collection to analytics, which is more likely to 
stimulate, rather than stifle, innovation. Furthermore, as data collection is highly concentrated 
and the services through which (observed) data is collected usually exhibit strong network effects, 
stronger competition at a data analytics level seems much more feasible and desirable than at the 
data collection level. 
 
Having access to greater quantities of data (e.g. both volunteered and observed data) will, in many 
applications, yield a better quality of inferred data (i.e. the actionable knowledge) and thus offer 
higher profit opportunities for firms. Therefore, the application scope of data portability - i.e. 
whether restricted to volunteered data or also encompassing observed data - is also crucial from 
an economic perspective.  
 
Data portability lowers switching costs and facilitates multi-homing. Moreover, widespread data 
portability, particularly if it occurs on a continuous basis and includes observed data, can facilitate 
algorithmic learning outside of the organisation where the data was created. The advantage of data 
portability is that personally identifiable data can also be transferred, and thus there is no trade-off 
between competition and privacy, which is inherent to access requests that are not user-initiated. 
At the same time, however, it is unlikely that all users will initiate a transfer of their data. Thus, 
the data set that is ported under data portability is likely to be more detailed on specific data 
subjects, but less representative of the user base as a whole. Whether such a data set is useful for 
a competing or complementing firm, is context specific and depends on the extent to which 
consumers make use of data portability. However, data portability does not alleviate consumer 
lock-in due to network effects; this would require some form of interoperability of services.  
 
Irrespective of the extent and mode of data portability, we do not think that data portability 
will lead to greater or less competition and innovation in established digital markets per 
se. It may, however, spur innovation in complementary and new digital markets. 
Widespread data portability could make it possible that innovation at the service level and 
innovation at the analytics level occur independently, i.e. within different organisations. Thanks to 
the non-rivalry of data, this would not mean that the current data controllers will lose access to the 
data, and can thus continue to be innovative at both the service and the analytics level. This lends 
itself to the hypothesis that user-induced data portability may increase the innovativeness of digital 
markets, rather than stifle it. However, although there is some tentative empirical evidence from 
Open Banking in the UK, currently there is a lack of empirical studies testing this hypothesis or 
other economic effects specific to data portability. 
 
IV. The economics of Personal Information Management Systems (PIMSs) 
 
The central premise of a PIMS for users is that it offers a centralised dashboard that 
seamlessly integrates with the various services that they are using, offering key functionalities 
such as identity management, permission management and data transfers. This requires a 
common set of de facto standards and high-performance APIs, through which a PIMS would 
be able to access the various services and users’ data. To date, however, such common standards 
are lacking. 
 
Furthermore, even if we look beyond the need for standards and API access to connect the various 
data sources of a user in a centralised PIMS, the question arises of how the business model of a 
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common business models that seek to generate revenues from: i) data markets by selling users’ 
data, ii) users directly, via a subscription model, or iii) data controllers by offering a compliance 
service are either not feasible or are unlikely to see widespread adoption. Specifically, a number of 
PIMSs that set out to monetise personal data on behalf of their users have failed in the recent past. 
Paying users for their data also gives rise to an ethical issue, as such a practice would quickly 
reveal that the data of some users is more valuable than others.  
 
V. Increasing the effectiveness of data portability 
 
To date, there is limited evidence that data portability is widely used in digital markets, and thus 
there is scope to make it more effective. To this end, we have developed policy recommendations 
in three areas.  
 
1. The first set of recommendations entails more effective enforcement and legal certainty on 
existing legal frameworks for data portability. Here, a first priority for policymakers is to 
increase the legal certainty on the scope and the limits of data portability under Article 20 
of the GDPR in the context of digital markets. In particular, it should be clarified to what extent 
observed data - including tracking and clickstream data - is to be included. It should also clarify 
whether there is an obligation to ask consumers for consent regarding the transfer of other data 
subjects that may concern them. 
 
We realise that at some point, these questions can become so complex that a case-by-case 
analysis will be necessary. Here, it should be clear what the main interests of the trade-offs are 
and where organisations and consumers can find legal guidance on balancing those trade-offs in a 
timely manner. In these cases, providers that are willing to facilitate data portability for consumers 
should be able to receive specific guidance by the privacy regulator in a cooperative approach. In 
this context, it is also worthwhile to discuss the use of sandbox regulation, as is the case in Open 
Banking, in order to provide a safe harbour under which data portability can be developed further. 
 
A second priority is for greater transparency on the categories and extent of personal data 
that firms in the digital economy hold on a certain data subject. This information should be readily 
available to users before any formal access request (Art 15(3) GDPR) or data portability request 
(Art. 20 GDPR) is initiated. Data subjects already have these rights under Art. 12 – Art. 15 GDPR, 
but currently there still seems, in some cases, to be a lack of transparency over the actual extent 
of data collection pertaining to each data subject (e.g. on the extent of tracking data). 
 
A third priority is for more effective monitoring and enforcement of the existing provisions 
on data portability under GDPR. This requires that the scope and the limits of these provisions 
are clear in the context of the digital economy (primary priority), and that users are well aware 
about which data is available about them and can be ported (secondary priority). 
 
2. Next, we argue for investigating the need and feasibility of a new, proportionate rule 
that enables consumers to transfer their personal and non-personal data in a timely and 
frequent manner, from their existing digital service provider to another one at any time. This is 
what we refer to as ‘continuous data portability’. As there is a possibility that such a regulation 
amplifies the legal and economic risks and trade-offs inherent to data portability, it is vital that the 
previously raised legal uncertainties are thoroughly addressed in advance. The scope of data to be 
ported under such continuous data portability should match that under GDPR Article 20. Moreover, 
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data portability should only apply when the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs; it should not 
be overly burdensome for small and emerging digital service providers.  
 
Continuous data portability requires a dialogue and code of conduct on common data 
standards and APIs. We believe that standardised APIs that enable continuous data portability 
are a prerequisite for encouraging more firms to import personal data, and for encouraging more 
consumers to initiate such transfers. Ultimately, this is likely to spur innovation and competition in 
digital markets, although it is unlikely to disrupt existing market structures.  
 
This will echo ongoing policies in the UK and Australia, and we believe that the European 
Commission - in its Data Strategy - should follow suit. We therefore propose first attempting a 
participatory, adaptive and soft approach, similar to what was done in the Free Flow of Data 
Regulation. If there is insufficient progress made in establishing standards and operational 
interfaces within a specified period, it may require stronger governmental intervention or 
guidelines to ensure progress is made and that neutrality of interests are warranted, as was the 
case for PSD2 and Open Banking. 
 
3. Finally, in order to enable a centralised consent management through PIMS, additional 
standards need to be agreed above and beyond those needed for data transfers. We think 
that the importance of this should not be underestimated, because it is crucial that consumers are 
aware of their given consents and are able to exercise their rights with little to no transaction 
costs, particularly if this is the basis on which data is being shared between firms. 
 
We also expect that, if such standards are in place, there will be considerable development in 
open-source communities, providing decentralised, non-profit solutions. Given the potentially 
sensitive nature of the data being handled through PIMS, public oversight may still be necessary, 
such as through privacy seals and certification. 
 
To achieve critical mass for PIMSs, one fruitful avenue may be to build a user base from existing 
(or developing) identity management solutions. In particular, the EU could be more active in 
encouraging PIMSs by coupling development of its consent standards more closely to its 
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1. Introduction and background1 
 
Following a prolonged political tug-of-war, the new European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) came into force on 25 May 2018. It replaced the previously applicable European Data 
Protection Directive (95/46) from 1995. This originated in a time when personal data did not have 
its current economic and societal importance. Nowadays, of course, massive amounts of personal 
data are routinely collected, analysed and monetised - particularly in the digital economy – making 
use of advanced (big) data analytics.  
From both a legal and economic perspective, there are important elements in the GDPR that 
strengthen the rights of data subjects. Of particular note is the “right to data portability” under 
Article 20 of the GDPR, which is intended to allow users to exercise greater control over their 
personal data. This is also supposed to enable users to counteract lock-in effects when using digital 
services and to facilitate switching to alternative content or service providers. 
 
However, the GDPR was built on the premises of fundamental rights, but not on the premises of 
competition law, despite the fact that the right to data portability may have competition-enhancing 
effects. In fact, there has been little research to date on the actual economic effects that come 
about with the right to personal data portability. There are several reasons for believing that the 
economic effects of data portability are much more complex than simply a reduction in switching 
costs, as initially anticipated.  
This CERRE report scrutinises these economic aspects of data portability against a background of 
legal and technical considerations. In particular, the report looks beyond the current requirements 
of data portability as provided by the GDPR. It critically assesses whether additional legal 
requirements, such as a right to continuous access to personal data, would be complementary in 
making the right to portability more effective. It also examines how to establish an innovative, 
competitive and fair data ecosystem that benefits all players.  
For example, the GDPR and the right to data portability apply horizontally, independent of any 
measures of market power. Therefore, the right to data portability may, in some circumstances, 
reinforce the market power of some data-rich firms, while their smaller competitors are likely to 
suffer more from unique user data being ported to incumbents than vice versa. Moreover, the right 
to data portability does not encompass a continuous porting of data (facilitated, e.g. by Application 
Programming Interfaces or APIs). In addition, it is currently not entirely clear to what extent users 
can port their observed data (i.e. data implicitly given, such as via clicks and location). However, 
continued access to volunteered (i.e. data explicitly given) and observed data may be crucial in 
stimulating competition and the emerging landscape of Personal Information Management Systems 
(PIMS), whose vision is to offer users a centralised dashboard for monitoring and controlling the 
flow of their personal data. 
The topic of how the porting of data from one provider to another would affect innovation 
incentives and stimulate entry is one that also creates controversy. Some argue that, with 
frictionless data portability, there is a concern that the quality of content and service offers (e.g. 
financed by advertising) will decline. This is because data portability will allow more companies 
                                               
 
 
1 The authors are grateful to (in alphabetical order) Malte Beyer-Katzenberger, Marc Bourreau, Richard Feasey, Claire-
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access to the same personal data, intensifying the competitive situation on the data and 
advertising market. In other words, third parties could act as free riders on the data market, which 
could ultimately also harm the customer. The contrary argument says that the free flow of personal 
data (with safeguards to mitigate privacy and security risks and with the users’ consent) would 
stimulate innovation, as data would be freed from its existing silos and a much larger set of minds 
could gain. More generally, the OECD (2019)2 noted that data access and sharing is estimated to 
generate social and economic benefits worth between 0.1-1.5% GDP - in the case of public-sector 
data - and between 1.0-2.5% of GDP (as high as 4.0% in some studies) if private-sector data is 
included. 
We also investigate legal and technical questions arising from the context of more widespread data 
portability; for example, dealing with conflicts in fundamental rights of others if entire profiles are 
to be ported in social networks; or regarding the compatibility of data formats. From an economic 
perspective, we highlight some of the potential complex economic trade-offs arising from data 
portability. For example, committing to let the consumers port their data may make them more 
willing to send data in the first place, increasing consumer lock-in. 
We also examine ongoing developments of technical solutions for facilitating data portability 
beyond the current legal standards. This includes the Data Transfer Project (DTP), which is 
particularly interesting, as it is supported by major, data-rich companies such as Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft and Twitter. The expressed aim of this project is to build “a common framework with 
open-source code that can connect any two online service providers, enabling a seamless, direct, 
user-initiated portability of data between the two platforms.” The project intends to build on 
“existing APIs and authorisation mechanisms to access data” and then “uses service specific 
adapters to transfer that data into a common format, and then back into the new service’s API.” In 
other words, the platforms within the DTP become - to an extent - interoperable, allowing 
immediate and eventually continuous exchange of user data back and forth between platforms.  
However, DTP is not the only project of its kind seeking to facilitate the exchange and transfer of 
data between data holders. The Solid project, for example, which was founded by Tim Berners-Lee, 
envisions a new internet built on “linked data”, in much the same sense as the internet was 
envisioned by Berners-Lee as being “linked documents”, so-called hypertext. However, despite the 
importance of the subject, all of these projects are still relatively small in size and relevance, as we 
highlight in the report. 
Ultimately, the goal of this CERRE project is to identify how personal data portability can be made 
more effective, in order to truly empower consumers in the use of their data and to use the 
services they want. 
  
                                               
 
 
2 OECD (2019). Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data. Reconciling Risks and Benefits for Data Re-Use Across 
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The remainder of the report is organised as follows: 
 In Section 2, we summarise the EU legal framework on data portability, and more generally 
on data access and data exchange, focussing particularly on personal data. 
 In Section 3, we discuss technical aspects of data portability and data exchange, including 
standards, Personal Information Management Systems (PIMSs) and other ongoing software 
projects, such as the Data Transfer Project.  
 In Section 4, we highlight the relationship between data portability and the competitiveness 
and innovativeness of digital markets. 
 In Section 5, we focus on the economic aspects of PIMSs. 
 In Section 6, we draw conclusions from our legal, technical and economic discussion, 
developing policy recommendations to help make the portability right of the GDPR more 
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2. The EU legal framework on data portability3 
 
Although this report is focused on the portability of personal data, we also mention in this section 
the rules on non-personal data because the distinction between personal and non-personal data is 
not always easy to draw in practice and some predict that it will become increasingly difficult in the 
future with the advancement of big data analytics and the increased technical ability to re-identify 
a person through the available data points.4 The EU legal framework contains several rules 
imposing or encouraging the portability and the sharing of personal and  non-personal data. Some 
rules are horizontal and are mainly composed of: 
 for personal data, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)5 and competition law; 
 for non-personal data, the Digital Content Directive (DCD)6 applicable in a B2C relationship 
and the Free Flow of Data Regulation (FFDR)7 applicable in a B2B relationship as well as 
competition law. 
 
Other rules are sectoral and impose data sharing or portability in particular in: 
 the financial sector with Second Payment Service Directive (PSD2) imposing access to 
payment account data, which has been completed in the UK with the Open Banking 
Programme;8 
 the automotive sector with the new Motor Vehicle Regulation imposing access to some 
vehicle data;9 
 the energy sector with the new Electricity Directive imposing access to some customers 
data.10 
 
Those rules and incentives to share and port data may increase in the future. The Commission has 
clearly indicated in its new Data Strategy adopted in February 2020 that it wants to promote the 
sharing of non-personal data within EU common data spaces.11 
 
                                               
 
 
3 This section is partly based on I. Graef, T. Tombal and A. de Streel, Limits and Enablers of Data Sharing : An 
Analytical Framework for EU Competition, Data Protection and Consumer Law, TILEC Discussion Paper 2019-024, 
November 2019. 
4 According to GDPR, art. 4(1): “personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or 
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural 
person.” On the distinction between personal and non-personal data, see Commission Guidance of 29 May 2019 on the 
Regulation on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the European Union, COM (2019) 250, p.4-5 
5 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46 (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ [2016] L 199/1. 
6 Directive 2019/770 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning 
contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services, OJ [2019] L 136/1. 
7 Regulation 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the 
free flow of non-personal data in the European Union, OJ [2018] L 303/59. 
8 Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the 
internal market, OJ [2015] L 337/35, arts.66-67. 
9 Regulation 2018/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the approval and market 
surveillance of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for 
such vehicles, OJ [2018] L 151/1, arts.61-66. 
10 Directive 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal 
market for electricity [2019] OJ L 158/125, art.23. 
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Table 1: EU legal framework for data portability and sharing 
 
 Personal data 
 
Non-personal data 
Horizontal - GDPR (2016) 
 
- Competition law 
- DCD (2019) in B2C 
- FFDR (2018) in B2B 




- Financial: PSD2 (2015) and UK Open Banking (2016) 
- Automotive: Motor Vehicle Regulation (2018) 






Article 20 - Right to data portability 
 
1.The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she 
has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the 
right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal 
data have been provided, where: 
(a) the processing is based on consent pursuant to point (a) of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2) or on a 
contract pursuant to point (b) of Article 6(1);  
and (b) the processing is carried out by automated means.  
 
2.In exercising his or her right to data portability pursuant to paragraph 1, the data subject shall have the 
right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another, where technically 
feasible.  
 
3.The exercise of the right referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be without prejudice to Article 17. That 
right shall not apply to processing necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or 
in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller.  
 




2.1.1 The two data portability rights 
Data portability aims to strengthen the data subject empowerment, i.e. the power of control that 
the data subjects have on their own personal data and to re-balance the relationship between data 
subjects and data controllers.12 To do that, two specific rights are given to the data subjects: 
 First, a data subject has the right to receive the personal data concerning him which he has 
provided to a controller (the data giver) and to transmit those data to another controller (the 
data seeker) in a B2C2B relationship (art. 20(1) GDPR). For instance, a data subject can 
receive his current playlist from a music streaming service to find out how many times he 
listened to specific tracks or to check which music he wants to purchase and to port it to 
another platform to listen music from there.13  
 Second, a data subject has also the right to have his personal data transmitted directly from 
one controller to another in a more direct B2B relationship (art. 20(2) GDPR). In essence, 
                                               
 
 
12 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, WP242 rev.01, p. 4. 
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this means that a data seeker can import data directly from the data giver with the consent 
of the data subject. 
 
The first portability right (B2C2B) is the strongest as it should be exercised without hindrance from 
the data giver. According to the European Data Protection Board (EDBP), such hindrance could be 
‘fees asked for delivering data, lack of interoperability or access to a data format or API or the 
provided format, excessive delay or complexity to retrieve the full dataset, deliberate obfuscation 
of the dataset, or specific and undue or excessive sectorial standardisation or accreditation 
demands’.14 The second portability right (B2B) is weaker as it can only be exercised when 
technically feasible, which is assessed on a case-by-case basis. In this regard, the Data Transfer 
Project aims to create an open source platform allowing the direct portability of data between the 
participating data controllers (see Section 0). 
 
Those two (new) portability rights complement than the (old) data access right given by Article 
15(3) of the GDPR which provides that: 
 
The controller shall provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing. For any further 
copies requested by the data subject, the controller may charge a reasonable fee based on 
administrative costs. Where the data subject makes the request by electronic means, and unless 
otherwise requested by the data subject, the information shall be provided in a commonly used 
electronic form. 
 
The objectives of those different rights are distinct and complement each other: while the 
portability right aims at facilitating the technical re-use of the data and preventing user lock-in, the 
data access right aims at empowering the data subject by allowing him to understand what is done 
concretely with his data. Moreover, as explained in the following sub-sections, the scope of those 
different rights is also different: while the portability right is limited to personal data provided by 
the data subject, the right to data access applies to all personal data.15 
 
2.1.2 Data covered 
The scope of the portability right is limited to certain categories of personal data. The GDPR 
mentioned the data provided by the data subject. In its interpretative Guidelines, the EDPB 
mentions three categories of data:16 
 The data actively and knowingly provided by the data subject such as name, age, email 
address; 
 The observed data provided by the data subject by virtue of the use of the service or the 
device, such as search history, traffic and localisation data, the heartbeat tracked by a 
wearable device; 
 The inferred data and derived data created by the data controller on the basis of the data 
provided by the data subject such as the outcome of an assessment regarding the health of 
a user or the profile created in the context of risk management and financial regulations to 
assign a credit score. 
                                               
 
 
14 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p.15. 
15 On those differences, see T. Tombal, “Les droits de la personne concernée dans le RGPD”, In Le règlement général 
sur la protection des données (RGPD/GDPR): analyse approfondie, Larcier, 2018, p.514-515. 
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The EDPB notes that the portability right should be interpreted broadly and should cover the first 
two categories, i.e. the data that have been actively provided by the data subject but also the 
observed data, and only the third category (the inferred data) should not be covered. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the EU judges will follow such broad interpretation. 
 
If this interpretation is followed, web tracking data should be covered by the portability right as 
this is observed data. For such data, the data controller is the legal person that determines the 
purposes and the means of the processing of the web tracking data which could be the website or 
the third-party company depending of the specific circumstances of the case. The e-Privacy 
Directive is complementary to the GDPR as it imposes prior information obligation by the website, 
which could then be used by the data subject to exercise his portability right.    
 
The scope of the portability right is also limited by the type of processing and covers only personal 
data whose processing is based on consent or a contract. There is thus no general right to 
data portability as it does not apply to processing operations necessary for the performance of a 
task in the public interest vested in the controller, nor to processing operations necessary for the 
compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject. For instance, a financial 
institution has no obligation to respond to a portability request relating to personal data that has 
been collected in the context of the compliance with its legal obligation to fight money 
laundering.17 
 
Finally, the right to data portability only applies if the data processing is carried out by 
automated means, and therefore does not cover most paper files. 
 
2.1.3 Conditions for the data transfer 
Article 20 of the GDPR imposes that the data have to be provided in a structured, commonly 
used and machine-readable format.18 Recital 68 of the GDPR clarifies further that data 
controllers are encouraged to develop interoperable formats that enable data portability. According 
to the EDBP, “the terms structured, commonly used and machine-readable are a set of minimal 
requirements that should facilitate the interoperability of the data format provided by the data 
controller. In that way, ‘structured, commonly used and machine readable’ are specifications for 
the means, whereas interoperability is the desired outcome”. However, such interoperability goal 
should not go as far as imposing technical compatibility, as it is clarified by Recital 68 of the GDPR. 
 
According to the EDPB, ‘the most appropriate format will differ across sectors and adequate 
formats may already exist, and should always be chosen to achieve the purpose of being 
interpretable and affording the data subject with a large degree of data portability. As such, 
formats that are subject to costly licensing constraints would not be considered an adequate 
approach’ and ‘where no formats are in common use for a given industry or given context, data 
controllers should provide personal data using commonly used open formats (e.g. XML, JSON, 
                                               
 
 
17 Ibidem, p. 8. 
18 Machine-readable format is not defined in the GDPR but is defined in the Open Data Directive as ‘a file format 
structured so that software applications can easily identify, recognise and extract specific data, including individual 
statements of fact, and their internal structure’: Art.2(13) of the Directive 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and 
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CSV,…) along with useful metadata at the best possible level of granularity, while maintaining a 
high level of abstraction.‘19  
 
The EDBP also encourages cooperation between industry stakeholders and trade associations to 
work together on a common set of interoperable standards and formats to deliver the requirements 
of the right to data portability as is done by the European Interoperability Framework (EIF)20 which 
creates an agreed approach to interoperability for organisations that wish to jointly deliver public 
services.21 
 
In addition, Article 12(3) of the GDPR requires that the data giver provides information on action 
taken to the data subject without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt 
of the request. This one-month period can be extended to a maximum of three months for complex 
cases if that the data subject has been informed about the reasons for such delay within one 
month of the original request. 
 
Article 12(5) of the GDPR provides that data should be ported free of charge, unless the data 
controller can demonstrate that the requests are manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular 
because of their repetitive character. In this case, the controller may either charge a reasonable 
fee taking into account the administrative costs of porting the data or refuse to port the data.  
 
The EDPB notes that: ‘for information society services that specialise in automated processing of 
personal data, implementing automated systems such as Application Programming Interfaces 
(APIs) can facilitate the exchanges with the data subject, hence lessen the potential burden 
resulting from repetitive requests. Therefore, there should be very few cases where the data 
controller would be able to justify a refusal to deliver the requested information, even regarding 
multiple data portability requests’.22 The EDBP also specifies that ‘the overall system 
implementation costs should neither be charged to the data subjects, nor be used to justify a 
refusal to answer portability requests’.23  
 
2.1.4 Limits and safeguards 
Tensions can appear within the GDPR, as the personal data portability right promotes the exchange 
and reuse of data, while its principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation limit data 
                                               
 
 
19 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p.17-18. 
20 https://ec.europa.eu/isa2/eif_en 
21 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p.18. 
22 Ibidem, p.15. 
23 Moreover, some commentators noted that: Given that the right to data portability should not be considered solely as 
a "one-shot" - as it does not entail an obligation for the data holder to erase the ported data (Art. 20.3) - the 
"repetitive character" of the request should not be interpreted too strictly, otherwise this right will be deprived of its 
effectiveness. Thus, the mere fact of renewing the request to port the same data a second time, for example to 
forward them to a third controller, should not be sufficient to conclude that the request is "repetitive". In doing so, it 
will be necessary to make a case-by-case assessment of the repetitive or non-repetitive nature of the request, and 
therefore of the possibility for the controller to claim payment. Similarly, if the data subject exercises his right to 
portability again, towards the same controller, in order to port the data that has been updated since the first request 
(new data, modified data, etc.), this request should not be considered as repetitive as, by assumption, the data 
concerned will be different from the data ported the first time: T. Tombal, “Les droits de la personne concernée dans le 
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sharing.24 In practice, this means that these two principles have to be considered when 
implementing the data portability right. This articulation has to be done prior to the porting of the 
data. 
 
Indeed, the EDBP recommends that the data seeker should inform the data subjects about the 
purposes for which the ported data will be processed and about the categories of personal data 
that are adequate, relevant and necessary for these purposes, in order to prevent a breach of 
these purpose limitation and data minimisation principles.25 Moreover, if the data seeker realises 
that more than necessary data were ported for the purpose pursued, he will have to delete this 
excessive data as soon as possible, in order to avoid any liability issue. 
 
This clarifies one of the uncertainties regarding the liability faced by the data givers, namely 
whether there is a risk that they might be found liable for the unlawful processing of the ported 
data made by the data seeker because of a breach of these purpose limitation and data 
minimisation principles. Such a concern has been raised, among others, by Facebook in its White 
Paper on Data Portability and Privacy.26 This uncertainty stems from the fact that the GDPR does 
not tackle this issue. The EDBP has indicated that insofar as the data giver responds to the request 
for portability, it should not be held liable as a result of the processing carried out on the data by 
the data seeker.27 Indeed, the data giver acts on behalf of the data subject and should not be 
responsible for any later infringement potentially committed by the data seeker. Nevertheless, 
according to the EDBP, the data giver should still set up certain safeguards, such as internal 
procedures to ensure that the data that is actually transmitted matches the data whose portability 
is requested, in light of the purpose limitation and data minimisation principles.28  
 
These two principles will also have to be considered in order to limit the porting of personal data 
from other data subjects than the one exercising his data portability right. Article 20(4) of the 
GDPR provides that portability shall not affect the rights and freedoms of others. Accordingly, when 
a data subject exercises his right to data portability, it is necessary to ensure that the personal 
data of other data subjects, who have not given their consent to such portability, are not 
transmitted if the data seeker is likely to process the personal data of such third parties.29 Indeed, 
while the data subject at the origin of the portability request has given his consent to the data 
seeker or has concluded a contract with him, this is not the case for the other data subjects whose 
data could be ported as a result of the exercise of this right.30 
 
Given that the third parties in question have not consented to the transfer of their data to the data 
seeker, this transfer can only take place if the purpose for which the transfer is made is compatible 
with the data giver's initial purpose of processing.31 If this is not the case, the data seeker has to 
                                               
 
 
24 Resp. Article 5(1b) and (1c) of the GDPR. 
25 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p. 13. 
26 See Question 5 in Facebook (2019). Charting a Way Forward: Data Portability and Privacy. White Paper. Available 
at: https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/data-portability-privacy-white-paper.pdf  
27 Guidelines of 13 April 2017 of Working Party 29 on the right to data portability, p. 6. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Ibidem, p. 11. 
30 See also Question 3 in Facebook (2019). Charting a Way Forward: Data Portability and Privacy. White Paper. 
Available at: https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/data-portability-privacy-white-paper.pdf 
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rely on a new lawful basis for the processing of these third parties’ personal data, such as the 
legitimate interests basis.32 
 
In order to avoid such an issue, the EDBP suggests that the processing of these other data 
subjects’ personal data should be authorised only insofar as these data remain under the sole 
control of the data subject requesting the portability, and that they should only be processed for 
the purposes determined by this data subject.33 The data seeker could therefore not process these 
third parties’ data for purposes that he has defined himself, such as prospecting purposes. 
Moreover, the data seeker could not process these data for purposes that are not compatible with 
the purposes of the data giver. While being appealing in theory, this suggestion is nevertheless 
extremely restrictive and provides little interest for the data seeker, whose margin of manoeuvre 
will be severely limited.  
 
However, the EDBP makes another suggestion that is more interesting. It invites both the data 
giver and data seeker to implement technical tools allowing the data subject to select the personal 
data he wishes to port, while excluding, where possible, the personal data of other data subjects.34 
This makes it possible to avoid, upstream, a potential infringement of the rights of these third 
parties. However, this is not sufficient in itself, as some personal data of third parties might 
necessarily have to be ported. Accordingly, in addition to these technical tools, it must also be 
reflected on the implementation of consent mechanisms for these other data subjects, in order to 
facilitate data portability.35 Once again, the difficulty is the practical implementing of such a 
mechanism. For example, in the banking sector, it would be nearly impossible to obtain the 
consent of all the persons appearing in a list of banking transactions that a data subject would like 
to port to another bank. 
                                               
 
 
32 Article 6(1.f) of the GDPR. 
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2.2 Digital Content Directive 
 
Article 16 - Obligations of the trader in the event of termination 
 
3. The trader shall refrain from using any content other than personal data, which was provided or created by 
the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader, except where such 
content: 
(a) has no utility outside the context of the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader; (b) only 
relates to the consumer's activity when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader; 
(c) has been aggregated with other data by the trader and cannot be disaggregated or only with 
disproportionate efforts; or 
(d) has been generated jointly by the consumer and others, and other consumers are able to continue to make 
use of the content. 
 
4. Except in the situations referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 3, the trader shall, at the request of 
the consumer, make available to the consumer any content other than personal data, which was 
provided or created by the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader. 
 
The consumer shall be entitled to retrieve that digital content free of charge, without hindrance from the 
trader, within a reasonable time and in a commonly used and machine-readable format. 
 
5. The trader may prevent any further use of the digital content or digital service by the consumer, in particular 
by making the digital content or digital service inaccessible to the consumer or disabling the user account of the 
consumer, without prejudice to paragraph 4. 
 
 
2.2.1 Data retrieval right 
Like personal data protection law, consumer law also enables data portability, notably through 
Article 16 of the Digital Content Directive (DCD). The Directive applies to all suppliers of digital 
content or services (i.e. virtually any firm in the digital economy that collects data) when dealing 
with a consumer (i.e. any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside that person's 
trade, business, craft, or profession).36 The DCD grants a form of portability right for the non-
personal data provided or created by the consumer. However, this right for consumers does 
not apply in a number of situations when the content is of little practical use to the consumer, who 
therefore has a limited interest in the portability of such data, particularly in view of the fact that 
requiring such a mechanism is costly for the trader.37 
 
The DCD solely provides the consumer with a right to retrieve some of its non-personal data but 
does not allow the direct transmission of data between two traders. Nevertheless, the underlying 
idea of the DCD is to allow the consumers to retrieve their data in order to then share this data 
with other traders. This new right ensures that consumers can easily switch content providers, by 
reducing legal, technical and practical obstacles, such as the inability to recover all the data that 
the consumer has produced or generated through his use of digital content.38 
 
Unlike the GDPR, the DCD provides that, when the consumer terminates the contract, the trader 
must refrain from using the non-personal data provided or created by the consumer.39 The fate of 
                                               
 
 
36 Art.2(6) DCD.  
37 Recital 71 of the DCD. 
38 Recital 70 of the DCD. 
39 Article 16(3) of the DCD. The only exceptions are if the data has no use outside the context of the content or 
service; if the data only relates to the consumer's activity when using the content or service; if the data has been 
aggregated with other data by the trader and cannot be disaggregated or can only be disaggregated with 
disproportionate effort; or if the data has been generated jointly by the consumer and other persons who continue to 
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the data held by the original controller/trader therefore differs in the two regimes, as the GDPR 
does not prevent the original controller from continuing to use the ported data, while the DCD 
provides that the trader must refrain from using the data in the future unless it has been 
generated jointly by the consumer and others, and other consumers are able to continue to make 
use of the content.40 This difference can be explained by the fact that data can be ported at any 
time under the GDPR, while data portability is only made possible after the termination of the 
contract by the consumer in the DCD. 
 
2.2.2 Data covered 
While the GDPR applies to personal data that has been provided by or observed on the data 
subject, the DCD applies to any content other than personal data, which was provided or 
created by the consumer when using the digital content or digital service supplied by the trader. 
The scope of application of the DCD is thus complementary to that of the GDPR.41 This is welcome 
as the distinction between personal and non-personal data might be difficult to draw in practice.  
 
Indeed, given the GDPR's broad definition of personal data and the technological progress in big 
data and AI for identification, the vast majority of the data provided or created by the consumer 
are likely to be considered as personal data. In any case, it should be underlined that the “inferred 
and derived” personal data, which are not considered as data “provided” by the data subject, are 
neither covered by the GDPR nor by the DCD, and thus cannot be ported.42 
 
2.2.3 Conditions for the data transfer 
Using similar language than the GDPR, the DCD provides that the data must be returned to the 
consumer in a commonly used and machine-readable format. Regarding the deadline to reply 
to the request, the DCD only provides that the data should be given to the consumer within a 
reasonable time after the termination of the contract.  
 
While the DCD does not provide any further information as to how these terms must be 
interpreted, the deadline of one month provided for in the GDPR could arguably be used to assess 
this reasonable character. Finally, similar to the GDPR, the DCD provides that the consumer shall 
be entitled to retrieve the data free of charge.43 
 
  
                                               
 
 
40 Article 16(3d) of the DCD. 
41 This is explicitly stated in art. 16(2) of the DCD, which provides that the trader remains bound by the obligations of 
the GDPR, which prevails over the DCD in case of conflict (art.3(8) of the DCD). 
42 M. Ledger and T. Tombal, Le droit à la portabilité dans les textes européens: droits distincts ou mécanisme multi-
facettes ?, RDTI, N°72, p. 25-44. 
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2.3 Free Flow of Data Regulation 
 
Article 6 - Porting of data 
 
1.The Commission shall encourage and facilitate the development of self-regulatory codes of conduct at 
Union level (‘codes of conduct’), in order to contribute to a competitive data economy, based on the principles 
of transparency and interoperability and taking due account of open standards, covering, inter alia, the 
following aspects:  
 
(a) best practices for facilitating the switching of service providers and the porting of data in a structured, 
commonly used and machine-readable format including open standard formats where required or requested by 
the service provider receiving the data;  
 
(b) minimum information requirements to ensure that professional users are provided, before a contract for 
data processing is concluded, with sufficiently detailed, clear and transparent information regarding the 
processes, technical requirements, timeframes and charges that apply in case a professional user wants to 
switch to another service provider or port data back to its own IT systems; 
  
(c) approaches to certification schemes that facilitate the comparison of data processing products and services 
for professional users, taking into account established national or international norms, to facilitate the comparability of 
those products and services. Such approaches may include, inter alia, quality management, information security 
management, business continuity management and environmental management;  
 




The Free-Flow of Data Regulation (FFDR) applies to the porting of non-personal data in B2B 
relationships. The Regulation instructs the Commission to contribute to the development of EU 
Codes of conduct to facilitate the porting of (non-personal) data in a structured, 
commonly used and machine-readable format including open standard formats. 
 
On that basis, SWIPO (Switching cloud service providers and Porting Data), which is one of the 
Digital Single Market (DSM) Cloud Stakeholders Working Groups gathering more than 100 
stakeholders, adopted in November 2019 two drafts Code of conduct, whose relevant parts are 
reproduced in Annex I of this Report. 
 one on the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) market, 
 and another on the Software as a Service (SaaS) market.44  
 
Those Code of conducts will be assessed by the Commission by the end of 2022.45 In particular, 
the Commission will focus on: “(i) the impact on the free flow of data in Europe; (ii) the application 
of the Free Flow of Data Regulation, especially to mixed datasets; (iii) the extent to which the 
Member States have effectively repealed existing unjustified data localisation restrictions; and (iv) 
the market effectiveness of codes of conduct in the area of porting of data and switching between 
cloud service providers.”46 





45 FFDR, art. 8.  
46 Commission Guidance of 29 May 2019 on the Regulation on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in 
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The Commission also expects that the codes of conduct will be complemented by model contractual 
clauses allowing “sufficient technical and legal specificity in the practical implementation and 
application of the codes of conduct, which will be of particular importance for SMEs.”47 
 
2.4 Competition law: compulsory access to essential data 
 
Conditions of essential facilities48 
 
78. The concept of refusal to supply covers a broad range of practices, such as a refusal to supply products to existing 
or new customers, refusal to license intellectual property rights, including when the licence is necessary to provide 
interface information, or refusal to grant access to an essential facility or a network  
 
81. The Commission will consider these practices as an enforcement priority if all the following circumstances are 
present: 
- the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a 
downstream market, 
- the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market, and 
- the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm. 
 
 
2.4.1 Conditions of essential facilities and application to data 
The three main conditions of the essential facilities doctrine, which is the legal standard to impose 
access in EU competition law, are summarised in the Commission Guidance on the application of 
Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary abuses of dominant position. When applying those conditions to 
data, it is important to distinguish at which level of the data value chain access is requested. As 
explained by Gal and Rubinfeld (2019),49 this value chain consists of several refinement steps (see 
also Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 below): 
i. first, raw personal and non-personal data are collected directly or bought on a secondary 
data market; 
ii. second, data are structured and turned into information; 
iii. third, those structured data are analysed by algorithms and information is turned into 
knowledge, such as a prediction; 
iv. finally, the analysis of the structured data leads to an action such as improving products or 
offerings. 
 
Going down the value chain, the efforts and investments by the data owner increase and may even 
be protected by intellectual property rights. Hence, the interest in protecting property and 
investment incentives, which is one part of the balance when deciding to impose access, increases. 
The place in the value chain will determine the upstream market on which indispensability is 
assessed and the downstream market on which the elimination of competition and the emergence 
of a new product are assessed. It is also important to apply those conditions in the light of the 
characteristics of data as explained in Cremer et al (2019, pp.98-108). 
 
  
                                               
 
 
47 Ibidem, p. 17 and FFDR, recital 30. 
48 Guidance of 3 December 2008 on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Articles [102 TFUE] to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings O.J. [2009] C 45/7, paras78 and 81. 
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(i) Condition 1: Indispensability of data 
 
When access to raw data is requested, assessment of the indispensability condition implies an 
enquiry as to whether an alternative raw dataset is available or could be collected by a firm having 
the same size as the data owner (e.g. assessed by market share in the consumer market). 
Obviously, this is an empirical analysis that should be examined on a case-by-case basis. The wide 
availability and the non-rivalry of data often do not make them indispensable as the Commission 
has concluded in several past merger cases. However, in some cases, data collection may be 
subject to legal, technical and economic barriers which may make them indispensable (see, e.g. 
our discussion in Section 4.1.3). In addition, the fact that the requested data have not already 
been traded, which is very often the case in practice, should not be an obstacle to imposing sharing 
as it suffices that there is demand and that such demand can legally and practically be met. 
 
When access is about data structure, the assessment of the indispensability condition implies an 
enquiry as to whether the same information (not necessarily derived from the same raw data sets) 
is available or could be built by a firm having the same size as the data structure owner. Again, 
this is an empirical issue, but data structuring may show important network effects and become a 
de facto industry standard (see IMS Health explained below). Access may also be about structured 
data, i.e. the collected data and the structure. In this case, both assessments indicated are 
required. 
 
(ii) Condition 2: Elimination of effective competition in the downstream market 
 
The assessment of the elimination of downstream competition is very complex in case of data. 
First, the downstream market is not always known, as one of the main features of big data and AI 
is to experiment, crunch a lot of data without knowing in advance what information or knowledge 
will be found and what action might be taken. Therefore, the refusal to share data may lead to the 
possible elimination of a competitor on a not-yet-defined and future market. This requires a more 
dynamic analysis, better in line with market realities, but is more difficult to do and possibly 
increasing the risks of antitrust errors. 
 
Second, the data owner is often not (yet) active on the downstream market because, as explained 
by Drexl (2016:49): “a typical feature of the data economy is that data is collected for one purpose 
but may turn out to be interesting for very different purposes pursued by other firms of very 
different sectors.”50 The evolution of digital industries is quick and uncertain, and many firms are 
‘paranoid’ about the next disruptive innovation.51 Thus, a data owner may refuse to share data 
with a firm that is not (yet) a competitor either because it plans to enter in the downstream market 
(future offensive leverage) or because it fears that the data seeker will disrupt its business 
(defensive leverage). In short, given the characteristics of the data economy, refusal to deal while 
not being active on the downstream market may be an anti-competitive exclusionary conduct.  
 
  
                                               
 
 
50 J. Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data - Between Propertisation and Access, Max Planck 
Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper 16-13, 2016. 
51 Andy Grove, the iconic founder of Intel, wrote in 1999 a book that he famously titled: Only the paranoid will survive. 
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(iii) Condition 3: New product and consumer harm 
 
The interpretation of this condition is not very clear. The European Courts link this condition to the 
protection of the facility by an intellectual property right but have applied it more strictly in some 
cases than in others. The Commission integrates this condition into a more general consumer harm 
assessment. Taking the Courts’ interpretation, the first issue is thus to determine whether the data 
to which access is required are protected by intellectual property (IP) rights. That will depend, 
among other things, on the level in the value chain at which access is required. If there is IP 
protection, the next issue is whether the product that the access seeker aims to bring on the 
downstream market is sufficiently new or, at least improved, compared to the data owner’s 
products. Drexl (2016:52) is doubtful that this will often be the case as he considers that the 
generation of new information due to data sharing is often not sufficiently innovative to justify the 
compulsory licensing of the intellectual property right. 
 
However, more fundamentally, the assessment of this condition faces the same two difficulties 
analysed previously for the second condition, i.e. the product to be offered by the access seeker is 
often still unknown and the facility owner is often not (yet) providing a competing product. 
Therefore, the more general consumer harm approach proposed by the Commission is more 
appropriate to the characteristics of the data economy. Thus, the competition authority will have to 
examine whether, for consumers, the likely negative consequences of the refusal to share data 
outweigh, over time, the negative consequences of imposing data sharing. 
 
2.4.2 Relevant cases up to now  
Among the main essential facilities cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
three are information-related. In Magill, the Court of Justice validated the compulsory access to 
programme listings, data for which there was a legal barrier (the copyright) and which was a by-
product of the main activities of the broadcasters. In IMS, the Court of Justice set the conditions to 
impose access to a structure for data which was a de facto industry standard. In Microsoft, the 
General Court validated the compulsory access to interoperability information which were also 
close to de facto industry standard.  
 
Specifically in IMS,52 IMS-Health collected pharmaceutical sales information from wholesalers in 
Germany, structured them with the so-called 1860 brick structure linked to the German postal 
codes and developed with pharmaceutical companies and then provided sales reports to those 
pharmaceutical firms. IMS-Health had an intellectual property right on the 1860 brick structure and 
refused to licence it to NDC-Health which wanted to compete on the downstream pharma sales 
reports. Upon complaint by NDC-Health, the Commission had ordered interim measures forcing 
IMS to licence its brick structure that was found indispensable to carrying on business in the 
downstream market.53 In the meantime, a litigation took place before a German Court which made 
a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. 
 
 
In its reply, the Court of Justice decided that the refusal to licence an intellectual property right 
constitutes an abuse of a dominant position where the following conditions are fulfilled: 
                                               
 
 
52 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257. 
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 ‘the refusal is such as to reserve to the owner of the intellectual property, the right to 
market for the supply of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member State 
concerned by eliminating all competition on that market; 
 the undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer, on the market for the supply 
of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner of the 
intellectual property right and for which there is a potential consumer demand; 
 the refusal is not justified by objective considerations.’54 
 
Moreover, the Court of Justice decided that: ‘the degree of participation by users in the 
development of that structure and the outlay, particularly in terms of cost, on the part of potential 
users in order to purchase studies on regional sales of pharmaceutical products presented on the 
basis of an alternative structure are factors which must be taken into consideration in order to 
determine whether the protected structure is indispensable to the marketing of studies of that 
kind.’55 
 
Next to those EU cases, two non-digital national cases, which are very similar, are interesting. In 
both cases, a firm uses a customer list developed when it enjoyed a legal monopoly to promote a 
new service allowing it to compete unfairly through data cross-subsidisation which ‘un-levels’ the 
playing field between the former monopolist and the new entrants.  
 
The first case was decided by the French competition authority against the previous gas monopolist 
Gaz de France (now Engie) which was using its customer list to promote a new gas service. In an 
interim decision, the authority forced Gaz de France to share the list with its competitors on the 
gas market as such a database was developed under a legal monopoly and was not easily 
reproducible by new entrants.56 In the final decision, the authority imposed a fine of € 100 million 
on GDF.57  
 
The second case was decided by the Belgian competition authority against the National Lottery 
which was using its customer list to send a one-off promotional email to launch its new sports 
betting product.58 Given its nature and size, the authority concluded that the contact details could 
not have been reproduced by competitors in the market under reasonable financial conditions and 
within a reasonable period of time.59 
 
In the digital sector, two American cases are also interesting. In both cases, a small firm was 
relying on the data of bigger digital platform to provide data analytics services and then, at some 
point, was cut off from the access to that data. In the first case, PeopleBrowsr analysed Twitter 
data to sell information about customer reactions to products or about Twitter influencers in certain 
communities. At some point, Twitter decided that its data will not anymore be accessible directly, 
                                               
 
 
54 Para 52 of the Case with a re-ordering of the conditions. 
55 Para 30 of the Case. 
56 Decision 14-MC-02 of 9 September 2014 of the French Competition Authority, Direct Energie and UFC Que Choisir v. 
Engie. This decision is based on the opinion that the French competition authority had adopted in 2010: Opinion 10-A-
13 of the French Competition Authority of 14 June 2010 on cross-use of customers database. 
57 Decision 17-D-06 of 31 March 2017 of the French Competition Authority, Direct Energie and UFC Que Choisir v. 
Engie. 
58 Decision 2015-P/K-27 of 22 September 2015 of the Belgian Competition Authority, Stanleybet Belgium/Stanley 
International Betting and Sagevas/World Football Association/Samenwerkende Nevenmaatschappij Belgische PMU v.  
Nationale Loterij. 
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but should be bought from certified data resellers. Following a complaint by PeopleBrowsr, a 
Californian Court ordered, with interim measures, that Twitter had to continue to provide its data 
directly. Then the parties settled the case deciding that after a transition period, PeopleBrowser will 
get the data from the certified data resellers.60  
 
In the second case, hiQ analysed LinkedIn public available data to provide information to business 
about their workforces. At some point, LinkedIn limited access to this data by legal and technical 
means, because it wanted to provide similar services itself. Following a complaint by hiQ, a US 
federal district judge ordered LinkedIn to resume the supply of its data.61 
 
2.5 Sector-specific regimes 
 
2.5.1 Financial sector: Access to payment account data 
To stimulate competition and innovation in financial services, the Second Payment Service 
Directive of November 2015 (PSD2) establishes a framework for new FinTech services to access 
the payment account data62 for free in a secure way and after having obtained the consent of their 
customers.  
 
With regards payment initiation services,63 Article 66(4) of the PSD2 provides that: 
 
The account servicing payment service provider shall:  
 
(a) communicate securely with payment initiation service providers in accordance with [the 
common and secure open standards for communication imposed by the Commission]; 
 
(b) immediately after receipt of the payment order from a payment initiation service provider, 
provide or make available all information on the initiation of the payment transaction 
and all information accessible to the account servicing payment service provider regarding the 
execution of the payment transaction to the payment initiation service provider;  
 
(c) treat payment orders transmitted through the services of a payment initiation service 
provider without any discrimination other than for objective reasons, in particular in terms of 
timing, priority or charges vis-à-vis payment orders transmitted directly by the payer 
 
 
With regard to account information services,64 Article 67(3) of the PSD2 provides that: 
 
In relation to payment accounts, the account servicing payment service provider shall:  
 




provide-firehose-access/ and http://blog.peoplebrowsr.com/2013/04/peoplebrowsr-and-twitter-settle-firehose-dispute/ 
61 HIQ Labs v. LinkedIn. 
62 Defined as “account held in the name of one or more payment service users which is used for the execution of 
payment transactions” (Article 4.12 of the PDS2). 
63 Defined as “a service to initiate a payment order at the request of the payment service user with respect to a 
payment account held at another payment service provider”: Articles 4(15) of the PDS2. 
64 Defined as “an online service to provide consolidated information on one or more payment accounts held by the 
payment service user with either another payment service provider or with more than one payment service provider”: 
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(a) communicate securely with the account information service providers in accordance with 
[the common and secure open standards for communication imposed by the Commission]; and  
 
(b) treat data requests transmitted through the services of an account information service 
provider without any discrimination for other than objective reasons. 
 
This sector-specific legislation complements the B2B portability right of the GDPR as it compels the 
banks (original controllers) to allow direct transmission of the data subjects’ personal banking 
information to third party providers (payment initiation services or account information services). 
PSD2 goes further than the GDPR because, on the one hand, it forces the banks to ensure the 
technical feasibility of this B2B financial account data portability and, on the other hand, it makes 
this portability continuous as data subjects can request personal data at each transaction, 
facilitated by APIs. 
 
In order to facilitate and secure such data access and exchange, the Commission adopted 
regulatory technical standards on the basis of a draft submitted by the European Banking 
Authority.65 Those rules impose common and secure open standard for communication between the 
data giver (the account servicing payment service providers) and the data seekers (the payment 
initiation service provider or the account information service providers). 
 
The UK went further than the PSD2 with the Open Banking Programme which led to a common 
and open API to access to account information of the customers of the nine biggest banks of the 
country.66 This obligation was imposed by the UK antitrust and consumer protection authority, the 
Competition and Market Authority, in the context on its Retail Banking market investigation in 
order to increase competition and innovation in the sector.67  
 
In practice, the CMA forced those nine largest banks and building societies68: to fund and 
cooperate with an independent new body, Open Banking Implementation Entity (OBIE). The OBIE 
developed, within a fixed (and short) timeframe, read-only open and common technical and 
product data standards and read-and-write open and common banking standards for the sharing of 
transaction data. Those standards ensure that any communication is secure and based on the 
consent of the customers. Their establishment has been coordinated with the EU standards 
developed by the EBA and made compulsory by the European Commission. 
 
The main role of the OBIE is to (i) design the specifications for the Application Programme 
Interfaces (APIs) that banks and building societies use to securely provide Open Banking, (ii) 
support regulated third party providers and banks and building societies to use the Open Banking 
standards, (iii) create security and messaging standards, (iv) manage the Open Banking Directory 
which allows regulated participants like banks, building societies and third party providers to enroll 
                                               
 
 
65 Commission Delegated Regulation 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive 2015/2366 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer 
authentication and common and secure open standards of communication, OJ [2018] L 69/23, arts.28-36.  
66 See https://www.openbanking.org.uk/ 
67 See CMA Final Report of 9 August 2016 on the Retail Banking Investigation and CMA, pp. 441-460 and CMA Order of 
2 February 2017 on the Retail Banking Investigation, Sect. 10 to 14 and the Associated Explanatory Note, paras.28-39. 
All documents are available at: https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/review-of-banking-for-small-and-medium-sized-
businesses-smes-in-the-uk 
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in Open Banking, (v) produce guidelines for participants in the Open Banking ecosystem and (vi) 
set out the process for managing disputes and complaints. 
 
As underlined in the Furman Report (2019, p.70), ‘one positive example from Open Banking is the 
effectiveness of requiring at least a subset of firms to implement and deliver the solution. Without 
such powers, progress is likely to be slow, disjointed and in some cases non-existent. The issue is 
not just the complexity of agreeing on unified standards but, potentially importantly, misaligned 
incentives between the largest platforms and consumers. Another lesson is that just requiring 
common standards is not sufficient and that an active effort is needed to make this work in 
practice. 
 
The programme starts to show some success. At the end of 2019, it was used by 70 account 
providers (data giver) and 134 third party providers of payment initiations or account information 
services (data seekers) and 77% of SMEs and large corporations were already or were planning on 
using the Open Banking API.69 
 
2.5.2 Automotive sector: Access to vehicle diagnostic, repair, and maintenance 
information 
The Regulation on Motor Vehicles of May 2018 imposes an access to some vehicle data. Article 61 
of this Regulation deals with manufacturers' obligations to provide vehicle On-Board Diagnostic 
(OBD) information and vehicle repair and maintenance information and imposes that: 
 
1. Manufacturers shall provide to independent operators unrestricted, standardised and non-
discriminatory access to vehicle OBD information,70 diagnostic and other equipment, tools 
including the complete references, and available downloads, of the applicable software and 
vehicle repair and maintenance information.71 Information shall be presented in an easily 
accessible manner in the form of machine-readable and electronically processable 
datasets. Independent operators shall have access to the remote diagnosis services used by 
manufacturers and authorised dealers and repairers.  
 
Manufacturers shall provide a standardised, secure and remote facility to enable 
independent repairers to complete operations that involve access to the vehicle security system.  
 
2. Until the Commission has adopted a relevant standard through the work of the 
European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) or a comparable standardisation body, 
the vehicle OBD information and vehicle repair and maintenance information shall be presented 
in an easily accessible manner that can be processed with reasonable effort by independent 
operators.  




70 Vehicle on-board diagnostic (OBD) information is defined as: ‘the information generated by a system that is on 
board a vehicle or that is connected to an engine, and that is capable of detecting a malfunction, and, where 
applicable, is capable of signalling its occurrence by means of an alert system, is capable of identifying the likely area 
of malfunction by means of information stored in a computer memory, and is capable of communicating that 
information off-board’: art.3(49) 
71 Vehicle repair and maintenance information is defined as: ‘all information, including all subsequent amendments and 
supplements thereto, that is required for diagnosing, servicing and inspecting a vehicle, preparing it for road 
worthiness testing, repairing, re-programming or re-initialising of a vehicle, or that is required for the remote 
diagnostic support of a vehicle or for the fitting on a vehicle of parts and equipment, and that is provided by the 
manufacturer to his authorised partners, dealers and repairers or is used by the manufacturer for the repair and 
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The vehicle OBD information and the vehicle repair and maintenance information shall be made 
available on the websites of manufacturers using a standardised format or, if this is not 
feasible, due to the nature of the information, in another appropriate format. For independent 
operators other than repairers, the information shall also be given in a machine-readable format 
that is capable of being electronically processed with commonly available information technology 
tools and software and which allows independent operators to carry out the task associated with 
their business in the aftermarket supply chain. 
 
Then, Article 63 of the Regulation deals with the fee for the access to that information and provides 
that: 
 
1. The manufacturer may charge reasonable and proportionate fees for access to vehicle 
repair and maintenance information other than the records referred to in Article 61(10). Those 
fees shall not discourage access to such information by failing to take into account the extent 
to which the independent operator uses it. Access to vehicle repair and maintenance information 
shall be offered free of charge to national authorities, the Commission and technical 
services.  
 
2. The manufacturer shall make available vehicle repair and maintenance information, including 
transactional services such as reprogramming or technical assistance, on an hourly, daily, 
monthly, and yearly basis, with fees for access to such information varying in accordance 
with the respective periods of time for which access is granted.  
In addition to time-based access, manufacturers may offer transaction-based access for which 
fees are charged per transaction and not based on the duration for which access is granted.  
Where the manufacturer offers both systems of access, independent repairers shall choose 
systems of access, which may be either time-based or transaction-based. 
 
Finally, Annex X of the Regulation sets up some common relevant standards for the data access.72 
 
Thus, this Regulation on Motor Vehicle complements the GRPR and gives a sector-specific data 
access right for relevant car data to independent repairs in order to stimulate competition and 
innovation on this aftermarket. 
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2.5.3 Energy sector: Access to consumer data 
In order to stimulate competition and innovation among electricity suppliers, the new Electricity 
Directive of June 2019 imposes the sharing of consumer data, including metering and consumption 
data as well as data required for customer switching, demand response and other services. Article 
23(2) of the Directives provides that 
 
Member States shall organise the management of data in order to ensure efficient and secure 
data access and exchange, as well as data protection and data security.  
Independently of the data management model applied in each Member State, the parties 
responsible for data management shall provide access to the data of the final customer to any 
eligible party (…). Eligible parties shall have the requested data at their disposal in a non-
discriminatory manner and simultaneously. Access to data shall be easy and the relevant 
procedures for obtaining access to data shall be made publicly available. 
 
Regarding the fee for data access, Article 23(5) of the Directive provides that: 
 
No additional costs shall be charged to final customers for access to their data or for a request to 
make their data available. 
Member States shall be responsible for setting the relevant charges for access to data by 
eligible parties. 
Member States or, where a Member State has so provided, the designated competent authorities 
shall ensure that any charges imposed by regulated entities that provide data services are 
reasonable and duly justified. 
 
Here again, the Electricity Directive complements the GDPR by requiring Member States to set up a 
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3. Technical aspects of data portability and data sharing 
 
We now discuss technical aspects of data portability and data exchange, including a description of 
the way personal data is stored, the way data export features are currently implemented, 
standards, and emerging systems and scenarios. 
 
In this technical description, we mostly focus on the data managed by large technology companies, 
such as those that participate in the Data Transfer Project (namely, Apple, Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, Twitter). Smaller companies, and companies from other fields that do manage personal 
data, may proceed similarly, or may have more ad-hoc process in place to allow users to exercise 
their right to data portability. 
 
3.1 Data Models and Formats 
 
Personal data comes in a wide variety of forms: structured meta-information provided by the user 
(account information, contact lists, preferences, etc.), contributed content (social networking 
posts, multimedia content, etc.), telemetry information (log of user activity), collected sensor data 
(such as geolocation traces). An attempt at a categorisation of such user data is provided in the 
ISO/IEC 19944 standard73 but such a categorisation is necessarily coarse and incomplete. The data 
models and formats used to represent, store, and exchange data are strongly dependent on the 
kind of data used. 
 
At a very high level, it is customary to distinguish74: 
 structured data, which follows a rigid tabular format, with data records formed of a pre-
defined set of fields; 
 semi-structured data, which follows a hierarchical shape, mixing structured content and 
potentially unstructured text, with a range of data attributes that need not be defined ahead 
of time; 
 unstructured data, which do not fit in either of the previous categories, and comprises plain 
text in natural language, multimedia data (images, sounds, videos), and other arbitrary 
binary data. 
 
Structured data are typically exchanged as CSV75 files (a simple data format for tabular data), 
SQL76 files (a standard for relational database systems), or spreadsheet files, such as 
OpenDocument77 or Microsoft’s Office Open XML78. Note that none of these formats is ideal for data 
exchange: CSV is not fully standardised, with for instance no specified way of describing the 
character encoding used; existing implementations of SQL do not strictly follow the SQL standard, 
                                               
 
 
73 International Organization for Standardization. (2017). Information technology — Cloud computing — Cloud services 
and devices: Data flow, data categories and data use. ISO/IEC 19944:2017. 
74 Serge Abiteboul, Peter Buneman, Dan Suciu. (1999). Data on the Web: From Relations to Semistructured Data and 
XML. Morga Kaufmann 
75 Internet Engineering Task Force. (2005). Common Format and MIME Type for Comma-Separated Values (CSV) Files. 
RFC 4180. 
76 International Organization for Standardization. (2003) Database Language SQL. ANSI/ISO/IEC 9075:2003. 
77 International Organization for Standardization. (2006). Information technology — Open Document Format for Office 
Applications (OpenDocument) v1.0. ISO/IEC 26300:2006. 
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which makes it difficult to use SQL for data exchange unless a specific database system is 
targeted; spreadsheet formats are very complex and include many features beyond the scope of 
simple structured data representation. 
 
Semi-structured data can be represented using a variety of standards. XML79 was designed as a 
simple data exchange format for semi-structured information, which comes with a broad 
ecosystem of tools and associated standards. JSON80 is originally the way object literals are written 
in the JavaScript programming language, but has been repurposed as an alternative to XML, with 
the main advantage of being less verbose. RDF81 is a framework for representing information in the 
form of semantic graphs: an RDF statement links a semantic concept (the subject) to another 
semantic concept or data value (the object) through a semantic predicate that indicates the 
relation between subject and object. RDF was introduced in the setting of the Semantic Web, and 
is adapted to arbitrary semi-structured information; it comes with a variety of serialisation formats, 
such as Turtle82 or RDF-XML83. 
 
In both the structured and semi-structured cases, file formats only specify a syntactic layer on the 
way information is represented. To make sense of the data, it is necessary to know the schema of 
the data, i.e. what fields and data attributes exist, and what constraints on the data values should 
be respected. CSV and spreadsheet files do not offer any schema description capabilities, apart 
from giving names to columns. SQL includes a data definition language (DDL) that specifies the 
types and constraints on fields used in SQL tables. XML documents can similarly include a 
document type definition (DTD), a simple way of describing the respective document’s schema, 
and use more elaborate XML schema languages, such as XML Schema84, in order to express more 
complex constraints. An analogous of XML Schema for JSON does exist under the name JSON 
Schema85, but is currently not fully standardised and less frequently used. Finally, RDF data can be 
associated with complex schemas and logical constraints, expressed in the form of the RDF 
Schema86 language or OWL87 ontologies. 
 
Beyond the syntax (given by the file format) and the schema and constraints (given by the schema 
annotations, when available), data needs to be interpreted with respect to a specific semantics, 
which gives meaning to data fields and attributes. This is sometimes called a data dialect or 
vocabulary. In some application areas, these dialects are standardised: for instance, GPX88 is a de-
facto standard for exchanging GPS traces as an XML dialect; jCard89 is a standard for contact lists 
as a JSON dialect. In the RDF world, de-facto standards emerge by re-using and combining data 
                                               
 
 
79 World Wide Web Consortium. (2008). Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition). W3C Recommendation 
80 Internet Engineering Task Force. (2017). The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format. RFC 
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vocabularies: Schema.org90 is a collaborative effort for proposing data vocabularies of use to 
search engine companies; Dublin Core91 is a de-facto standard of a data vocabulary describing 
digital and physical works. When no prior dialect exists, ad-hoc dialects are created by the data 
controller, which requires additional documentation. In this situation, when data is exchanged 
between two data controllers which use different dialects (this is called schema heterogeneity), it is 
necessary to transform it from one schema to another, using schema mappings92 from the source 
to the destination schema; these schema mappings are most of the time hand-written by data 
engineers, though there is sometimes the possibility of automatically learning them from 
examples93. 
 
Finally, in the case of unstructured data, note that, for some specific applications, there are also 
standards, such as multi-media file formats, which are out of scope of this report. Arbitrary text 
and binary data are stored and exchanged in an ad-hoc manner, and also require documentation. 
 
3.2 Data Storage and Accessibility 
 
We now discuss how personal data may be stored and accessed by the data controller. Again, we 
focus on personal data managed by large technology companies. 
 
In almost all cases, it is necessary for the data to be (very) efficiently accessible upon request. This 
is true whenever data may be used by the data controller in real-time applications, e.g. for display 
when a web page is accessed. This means any data item of interest needs to be retrievable with a 
latency of the order of a second or less. This is sometimes made formal: for example, the 
architecture used by Amazon (such as for retrieving customer and order data) provides service-
level agreements (SLAs) for complex aggregation of data of the form: “a response must be given 
within 300ms for 99.9% of requests”.94 
 
There are a few exceptions, when data is stored in ways that preclude its efficient retrieval. In 
particular, data for which no real-time access is needed (historical transaction data of banking 
systems, query logs of web search engines when they are not used for other purposes, etc.) are 
sometimes moved to archiving systems95 where access may incur a large latency or even involve a 
manual process. However, these cases are rare in systems of large technology companies, as most 
personal data is used for producing web content in one form or another. 
 
To support fast access, data is stored in some form of database management system. The most 
common type of such systems are traditional relational database management systems96 
(commercial systems such as Oracle, IBM DB2, Microsoft SQLServer; or open-source ones such as 
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MySQL, PostgreSQL, or MariaDB), also called SQL systems as they rely on the SQL standard 
language. Such systems manage large quantities of structured data (easily scaling to terabytes of 
content), typically stored on magnetic disk (hard drives), with the possibility of data being 
distributed97 on a small cluster of servers, with latencies for typical queries of the order of a dozen 
of milliseconds. 
 
SQL database systems are not adapted to all storage and access tasks, however: they are ill-
equipped to store and query semi-structured data, to store extremely large amounts of data (of 
the order of a petabyte or more) or to provide extreme performances (e.g. sub-millisecond 
latencies). As an alternative, a wide variety of systems have been proposed under the collective 
term of NoSQL98. This term covers very different kinds of systems. On the one hand, there are 
systems that propose a different data organisation than the relational, tabular model: XML 
databases (e.g. BaseX, eXist, MarkLogic server) for handling and querying XML-structured data; 
triple stores (e.g. Virtuoso, Jena, RDFox) for RDF data; document stores (e.g. CouchDB, MongoDB) 
for storing semi-structured documents with limited query capabilities. On the other hand, there are 
systems that focus on performance and storage of extremely large amounts of data: wide column 
stores (e.g. Google’s Bigtable, Apache Hbase, Apache Cassandra) with a tabular structure but 
flexible schema, and extreme scaling capabilities; key-value stores (Amazon DynamoDB, 
Voldemort) with extreme performances. 
 
Though traditional SQL systems are still by far the dominant mode of data storage99, most large 
technology companies (including Facebook, Google, Amazon, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) have made 
the switch from traditional relational database systems to NoSQL systems focussing on 
performance, because of their extreme needs in terms of latency, data volume, or query 
throughput. In some cases, these NoSQL databases are used in combination with traditional SQL 
databases, depending on applications. There is also a trend to go towards NewSQL systems (such 
as Google’s Spanner) that provide SQL support, rich features as with SQL systems, but higher 
performance by moving data to main memory or eliminating traditional bottlenecks of SQL systems 
(locking, logging, cache management). 
 
In addition to the core system used to store data, an additional caching layer is also often used, to 
provide faster response to common queries by storing responses in main memory. Redis is a 
popular open-source such in-memory data store. 
 
Whatever the technology used, it is important to note once more that, as long as some data is 
needed in a real-time applications, it will need to be accessible efficiently, with typical sub-second 
latencies. 
 
3.3 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 
 
Before describing technical ways that can be used to implement the right to data portability, it is 
necessary to introduce the basics of web services, more commonly called (Web) Application 
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Programming Interfaces100, or APIs for short. They will form a key component in the 
implementation of various data export and transfer scenarios. 
 
It is common for a user to be able to access his or her personal data through a web-based 
interface (a website, or possibly a smartphone application). This web-based interface is usually 
only meant for human users. It is technically possible to program a system that can access the 
same personal data as the users, by using the login credentials of the user and mimicking the 
interaction of a human with this web-based interface. However, this is usually discouraged by the 
developer of the interface, and often even disallowed in the terms and conditions of use of the 
interface. 
 
A web service, or API, is a technical interface to access the data that is meant to be used by 
programs, in particular by third-party software that introduces novel applications of the data. 
Although there is no requirement to offer such APIs, they are commonplace as they allow the data 
controller to specify what kind of access third-party software have, with even the possibility of 
introducing monetisation of richer forms of data access. APIs usually allow access to a subset of 
the features accessible to human users (for instance, they may disallow modifying the data), and in 
particular to a subset of the corresponding data. However, they may also provide access to more 
data than what is available through the web interface for users, because such data is not meant to 
be processed by humans. In any case, it is common to impose rate limitations on APIs, in terms of 
the maximum number of calls to the API authorised within a given time period.  
 
Although web services were traditionally implemented in SOAP101, a technology allowing complex 
sequences of structured messages, modern APIs use a much simpler RESTful approach, this name 
meaning that they follow a Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture. A specificity of 
REST architectures is that the use of the API is assumed to be stateless: no information is kept 
from one call to the API to the next, all relevant information needs to be given in the parameters to 
the API call. This ensures scalability of APIs, allowing for many concurrent requests. 
 
In order to be used to access personal, potentially private, data, the use of APIs need to be 
combined with an access delegation protocol, that verifies that the call to the API has been 
authorised by the user whose data is being accessed. The most commonly used such protocol is 
OAuth 2.0102. OAuth involves three parties: the data controller (which controls the API), the data 
subject (whose data is being accessed), and the client, which is the application that accesses the 
API. The typical workflow for authorisation is as follows: the client refers the data subject to a web 
page of the data controller, which indicates to the data subject the set of permissions that are 
requested; if the data subject approves the request, the data controller will issue the client an 
opaque access token, which the data controller associates with a set of permissions and a duration 
validity. This token then needs to be used by the client every time the API is called, to demonstrate 
that it has been authorised to make the request by the data subject. 
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Now we have introduced the important notions of API, rate limitation, access delegation, and 
access token, we are ready to describe data export and transfer scenarios. 
 
3.4 Data Export Modes 
 
We now review different possible technical modes for implementing the right to data portability, 
and discuss the current state of implementations. We first distinguish between data export and 
data transfer: data export is when the data subject receives the data from the data controller, as 
per Article 20(1) of the GDPR. Data transfer is when the data is exchanged directly from one data 
controller to another, without the need for the data subject to be involved, as per Article 20(2) of 
the GDPR. Let us first consider the simpler case of data export. 
 
We distinguish three different modes of implementation of the data facilities: 
 
- Asynchronous data export. The data subject requests the data at a given point of time, 
which the data controller produces after some possibly lengthy period of time and makes 
available for download. 
 
- Pull-based data export. The data subject requests the data at a given point of time, which 
the data controller provides as a response, within usual interactive response times (of the 
order of one second or less). 
 
- Push-based data export. The data subject registers with the data controller his or her 
intent to retrieve the data; as soon as new data is produced or collected, the data 
controller sends it to the data subject. 
 
In all three modes, there is also the question of the scope of the request of the data subject: the 
data subject may request the entirety of its personal data, or part of it, specified by a query: this 
may be, for instance, the part produced or managed by a specific application of the data controller, 
or all data obtained since a given time (which we call time-based queries). Using the push-based 
mode, or a combination of the pull-based mode and time-based queries, the data subject is able to 
obtain a continuous view of its personal data (in push-based mode, nearly in real time; in pull-
based mode, every time the data subject issues a request, e.g. every hour or every day). This is 
not directly possible in the absence of time-based queries or in the asynchronous mode, since the 
former requires a possible complex analysis of what has changed between two snapshots of a 
user’s personal data, and the latter does not provide near-instantaneous responses. 
 
We now review the current practice of a sample of large technology companies (Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, and Twitter) with respect to the access provided to personal data (under the right to 
data portability and beyond). 
 All propose an asynchronous data export mode103, with usually very limited query 
capabilities, mostly allowing to select specific applications or categories for which to export 
the data. No guarantee is given about the delay needed to produce the data, which is for 
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practical purposes of the order of the minute or hour (Google for instance indicates “This 
process can take a long time (possibly hours or days) to complete.”, while Twitter states that 
the download link will be available within 24 hours). In addition to this delay, additional 
restrictions may apply: Twitter for instance states that only one request may be issued every 
thirty days. Finally, this data export process is not automatable: it requires the user to 
manually select the corresponding option in her or his profile. 
 All propose a set of specific APIs104 that allow for pull-based retrieval of some part of the 
personal data, with usually complex query capabilities, including time-based queries. 
Contrarily to the asynchronous data export mode, access to these APIs is meant to be 
automated. As previously mentioned APIs require access authorisation before providing any 
private data, but do not typically allow access to all private data. For example, the Facebook 
API does not provide access to the full timeline of a user; Google discontinued in 2013 the 
Latitude API, which allowed access to a user’s geolocation history105 and has not provided 
any alternative. In addition, APIs almost always come with drastic rate limitations.106 
 Very few push-based data export facilities are available. An example is the real-time Twitter 
streaming API107 that can be used to export all public data of a given user. 
 
The outcome of the asynchronous data export mode is a compressed ZIP archive of various files, of 
diverse formats and schemas; most common formats are JSON for semi-structured information 
and multimedia file formats for images, audio, etc., but Google, notably, includes in its data export 
a wide variety of formats, including XML dialects and CSV. 
 
The output of APIs is usually JSON files, again in a wide variety of dialects, with little to no 
standardisation from one company to the other. 
 
If most personal data is efficiently accessible (see Section 0), why may it take hours or days to 
provide asynchronous data? A reason is the potentially very large amount of data involved. Indeed, 
Google’s data export includes all photos uploaded by a user to Google Photos, or all documents 
shared on Google Drive. This may represent gigabytes of data or more, which takes a non-
negligible amount of time (indeed up to several hours) to copy, package, and compress within a 
ZIP archive, even when directly accessible. Note that this is mostly specific to unstructured data 
formed of multimedia or arbitrary binary files, as the structured and semi-structured personal data 
of a user tend to represent a more reasonable volume (for instance, geolocation traces, which are 
one of the most frequently updated form of personal data, amount to only a few kilobytes per day, 
i.e. no more than a few dozen megabytes over the entire life of a user). 
 
It would be very much possible for technology companies to provide pull- or push-based data 
exports of all personal data, as long as it is not expected that a single request results in the 
download of the entire dataset as in the asynchronous mode; handling multimedia content, for 
example, could mean issuing one request to get the list of all files, and accessing each file one by 
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one. This would be compatible with the way data is stored and accessed, and would allow a data 
subject to obtain a continuous view of his or her personal data. 
 
3.5 Data Transfer Modes and Emerging Systems 
 
We now go beyond data export and consider data transfer scenarios108, where the personal data of 
a data subject is transferred from one data controller (the source) to another (the destination). To 
illustrate, this can mean transferring a user’s photos from Google Photos to Apple’s iCloud, a user’s 
documents from Microsoft Office 365 to Google Docs, a user’s text message from Whatsapp to 
Skype, or a user’s event calendar on Facebook to Apple Calendar. 
 
The different modes we discussed in the previous section (asynchronous, pull-based, and push-
based), as well as the notion of continuous data access and that of scope of a query (what data 
items to consider), are still relevant for data transfer. But additional challenges arise: 
 As previously discussed, because of schema heterogeneity, the data formats used to model 
and store personal data can vary considerably from one platform to the other. In order to 
transfer data between these platforms, appropriate schema mappings need to be applied to 
transform the source data representation into the destination one. 
 Should the data transfer be one-way (from one platform to the other) or two-way (from one 
platform to the other and back)? In the case of two-way transfer, how should 
synchronisation and conflict resolution be handled (i.e. what to do if the same data item has 
been updated on both platforms since the last time data was transferred)? 
 
These are real challenges, but to simplify we will assume that schema heterogeneity is dealt with 
hand-crafted schema mapping (as is most often done in practice), and we will only consider one-
way transfers. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the asynchronous mode of data export requires a human 
intervention and is not meant to be automated. For this reason, in the case of data transfer, 
systems use pull-based (or occasionally push-based) APIs. 
 
There are two main ways to implement data transfer: 
 Direct exchange: Data is transferred directly from the source data controller to the 
destination data controller. Either the source or destination data controller may initiate the 
transfer, though it is most commonly done by the destination, as read access to data is more 
commonly provided by APIs than write access. Whatever the case, the data controller that 
initiates the data transfer now acts as a client to the API of the other data controller, using 
an access delegation protocol to obtain an access token to prove that it has been authorised 
by the data subject. Note that, before being added to the destination data controller, data 
needs to be mapped from the source schema to the target schema by the data controller 
that initiated the data transfer. 
 Exchange through a third-party: Data is transferred from the source data controller to a 
third-party system (such as a PIMS, see below), with the third-party acting as a client of the 
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API of the source data controller. Then the third-party system uses an API of a target data 
controller providing write access to transfer the data to that third-party. The third party is 
responsible for mapping the source data to the target schema. 
 
Note that the first scenario requires the destination (respectively, source) data controller to 
implement themselves the data transfer capability and the mapping from the source schema 
(respectively, to the target schema), but only a single API is needed. In the second scenario, the 
data transfer and schema mappings are handled by the third-party system, but there need to 
exists both a read-access API on the source data controller and a write-access API on the target 
controller. 
 
In the first scenario, the data subject needs to grant permission to one data controller to access 
the API of the other. In the second scenario, the data subject needs to grant permission to the 
third-party system to access the APIs of both data controllers. In both cases, there is a trust issue 
since the permission associated to access tokens are rarely fine-grained enough that the data 
subject can be confident that the only use that will be made of them is for the data transfer task. 
For instance, their validity in time may extend beyond the time needed for the data transfer. 
 
We now discuss two emerging types of systems that implement data transfer: personal information 
management systems, or PIMSs, and the Data Transfer Project. 
 
3.5.1 Personal Information Management Systems (PIMSs) 
 
A Personal Information Management System109 (or PIMS for short) is a system that allows a user 
to build an integrated view of her own personal data, e.g. emails and other kinds of messages, 
calendar, contacts, web search, social network, travel information, work projects, etc. Such 
information is commonly spread across different services. The goal is to handle all the personal 
data of a user in a system that the user controls and trusts; this may mean repatriating all the 
data on the PIMS, or keeping the data distributed but using the data integration110 methodology to 
interface with the different data sources.  
 
The former approach is sometimes called data warehousing (as all retrieved data is stored in a 
local data warehouse) whereas the latter is called the mediator approach (a mediator system is 
charged of rewriting all user queries to queries over the original data sources). The mediator 
approach is more scalable, as it does not require as much local storage and computation resources 
as the warehousing approach, but heavily relies on the availability of powerful enough APIs to 
express translated user queries. Both the data warehousing and mediator approach also require 
the careful, often manual, design of schema mappings to overcome the heterogeneity between the 
information schema used by the PIMS and that of the various data sources. 
 
On the basis of such PIMS, novel applications can be built that exploit the fact that the entire 
personal information is (possibly virtually) available. For instance, a user may formulate queries 
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such as “What kind of interaction did I have recently with Alice B.?”, “Where were my last ten 
business trips, and who helped me plan them?”; the system has then to orchestrate queries to the 
various services (which means knowing the existence of these services, and how to interact with 
them), and integrate information from them (which means having data models for this information 
and its representation in the services), e.g. align a GPS location of the user to a business address 
or place mentioned in an email, or an event in a calendar to some event in a web search. 
 
With respect to data transfer, PIMSs act as a separate data controller, with direct exchanges from 
external data controllers to the PIMSs. Though this is not their main function, PIMSs may also offer 
the possibility of pushing the data to other data controllers, acting in this case as a third party 
between the source and destination data controllers. By nature of the role of a PIMSs, continuous 
data exchanges are favoured: at any point in time, a PIMS aims at having a complete and up-to-
date view of the personal data of a user. 
 
The PIMS initiates API calls, controls access tokens, and implements schema mappings. It is 
therefore crucial that it is fully trusted by the user. Several models allow this: Cozy Cloud111 is a 
company that offers private cloud services (with each user hosted on a private virtual machine) on 
which PIMSs can be deployed; Digi.me112 offers a PIMS with fine-grained control on what private 
data is sent to which data controller. 
 
3.5.2 Solid 
An alternative but similar approach is proposed by the Solid113 project led by Tim Berners-Lee. 
While the project is still in its infancy, the goal is to build a fully decentralised space for personal 
information, with data distributed over multiple personal online data stores (pods) located on 
different hosts, with a mechanism allowing a user to grant third-party applications fine-grained 
access to specific data items on specific pods. Each pod can thus be seen as a data controller, with 
Solid acting as a specification of how pods interface with the world, and as an overall infrastructure 
on top of these pods. 
 
At the time being, Solid is still under active development, and the question of importing data from 
legacy data controllers has not been solved. It is currently a software project of a somewhat 
moderate size. An imperfect software metric often used to estimate the rough complexity of a 
system is the number of source lines of code; for the Solid server, this is roughly 32k at the time 
being. For comparison, the number of lines of code of the Nextcloud114 open-source project, a 
widely deployed platform for self-hosting of cloud services with some limited PIMS capabilities, is 
around 730k. Other common metrics (such as the number of times the project was forked on the 
Github platform, which is in the hundreds for Solid) consistently point to a project of moderate size 
and impact – roughly a tenth of that of a widely deployed system such as Nextcloud (two thousand 
forks). 
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3.5.3 The Data Transfer Project (DTP) 
The Data Transfer Project115 is a technical initiative that was launched in 2018 by large technology 
companies. Specifically, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter are associated with the 
project. The main outcome of this initiative is the development of a specification and of an open-
source platform for data transfer. Though these five companies are nominally involved, the project 
inherits from Google’s former Data Liberation Front, and Google is by far the main contributor to 
the DTP platform (with Facebook also contributing, but at a similar level as independent 
contributors), as is shown by the following analysis of the source code of the system (analysis of 
the Git repository as of March 17, 2020): 
 
Institution 
Proportion of changes  
(commits) 
Proportion of changes 
(source code lines) 
Google 83,21 % 80,96 % 
Facebook 10,05 % 3,26 % 
Others 6,74 % 15,78 % 
 
The DTP aims at supporting both direct exchange and exchange through a third-party, though 
direct exchange is the mode that is favoured. The DTP envisions the role of a hosting entity, which 
is the entity in charge of initiating the data transfer. It is usually meant to be either the source or 
destination data controller, but it can also technically be a third-party system (indeed, the provided 
demonstration server acts as a third-party hosting entity). As previously discussed, the hosting 
entity is the one that controls the access tokens, and therefore needs to be trusted. 
 
At the time being, the DTP does not consider continuous data transfer; the main application 
scenario is a bulk transfer at the initiative of a data subject who decides to move from one platform 
to another. 
 
Note that the Data Transfer Project is under development at the moment and cannot be considered 
as a stable product. A number of import or export connectors have been implemented to interface 
with various platforms, but there are very few public-facing sites that do use the DTP (the most 
prominent being a specific use case on Facebook: users have been able very recently to use it to 
transfer their photos to Google Photos116). However, it is possible to test the infrastructure by 
using the provided demonstration server. Software metrics for the DTP are of the same order of 
magnitude as that of Solid: 44k of lines of code, hundreds of forks; well under those of a project 
such as Nextcloud, or of other projects that a company like Google or Facebook dedicate effort 
into, such as their machine learning computation frameworks, respectively Tensorflow117 (2.5 
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3.6 Summary: How to Make Data Portability Work? 
 
As we have seen, the current way data portability rights can be technically exercised is minimal 
and far from ideal: 
 it is only possible to perform asynchronous data exports; 
 there is no guarantee on the delay between the request and the availability of the data; 
 data provided in the export does not follow any specific standard, and includes a wide variety 
of data models, file formats, schemas, dialects, in a way that is not compatible between one 
data controller to the other; 
 data exchange facilities are not implemented by data controllers. 
 
We claim that this is not inevitable, and that there are no strong technical challenges in providing 
continuous pull- or push-based data exports, with limited delay (as long as specific solutions are 
implemented for large unstructured data). Indeed, the fact that large data controllers provide 
similar (though not complete) features through APIs means there is no particular burden in 
implementing them, and that such functionalities would not be a cause for performance issues 
beyond specific concerns about large files, which can be addressed separately. In order to better 
exploit exported data, data controllers should aim for more standardisation in data models (e.g., 
using common RDF dialects). 
 
Data exchange capabilities are currently impeded by the problem of schema heterogeneity, but 
assuming this problem is resolved (either by a standardisation of the data export models, or by 
manually compiled schema mappings), they do not pose any particular technical challenge. Data 
exchange through a trusted third-party (as in PIMSs, or as in the DTP where the hosting entity is 
on a trusted external host) has the advantage that access tokens need not be provided to the 
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4. The impact of data portability on competition and 
innovation in digital markets 
 
4.1 Preliminaries: the economics of data 
 
Understanding the economics of data portability requires foremost to acknowledge the economics 
of data. Here we focus at first on the differentiation between data, information and knowledge, 
only from the latter of which ultimately value can be derived. Moreover, we take a closer look at 
the asserted non-rivalry of data. 
 
4.1.1 The value of data, information and knowledge 
Data per se does not have any economic value as it is merely the (digital) representation of signals 
that have been received or perceived using some syntax. For example, the receipt of a light signal 
can be transformed into data by recording the time (e.g., using the syntax HH:MM:SS) and 
recording the “on” and “off” states (e.g., using the syntax “1” for “on” and “0” for “off”). Such data 
is transformed into information only if it is combined with semantics. For example, a corresponding 
semantic would be that the data is on received light as part of a communication effort using morse 
code.  
 
This gives the data a meaning (here: a message that is communicated), hence transforming it into 
information. Such information can then be transformed further into actionable knowledge with the 
additional input of and in combination with other pieces of information. For example, the received 
message may have been “HELP” and combined with the information that a friend is hiking all by 
himself in the mountains, in about the location from where the light beams have been received, 
leads to the actionable knowledge that he is in danger and that a rescue operation should be 
started.  
 
The same holds true, of course, for clicks (data) on an e-commerce site, which represent which 
products a shopper considered for purchasing (information) and which can then be used to infer 
which products the shopper might be interested in (knowledge). Ultimately only such actionable 
knowledge that is generated from data potentially has economic value and can increase welfare.  
 
Nevertheless, it is customary to refer to all three concepts – data, information and knowledge – 
simply as “data” in policy circles. Instead, ‘raw data’ is often differentiated from ‘derived’ and 
‘inferred data’ (see, e.g., Section 2.1.1). We will therefore follow this practice as well in the 
following. In order to do so, we need to introduce a related, but distinct terminology in the next 
subsection. 
 
4.1.2 Volunteered, observed and inferred data 
With respect to the economics of data it is also important to note a differentiation in how data was 
acquired about an individual consumer. As is customary, we distinguish between volunteered, 
observed and inferred data.  
 
Volunteered data is explicitly and intentionally revealed by a user, such as a name and birthday 
entered into a registration form, a post, tweet or rating submitted, or an image or video uploaded. 
Consumers are usually aware of the volunteered data that they revealed and often this is the only 
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is often also the only data that is fully made available by data controllers in response to a data 
portability request according to Article 20 GDPR. 
 
Observed data is obtained from the usage of a device, website or service and the user may or may 
not be aware that such data is collected. This ranges from clicks on products and purchase 
histories over geo-locations gathered by GPS sensors in smart phones to recording every single 
interaction of the consumer with the service–potentially even when the consumer does not even 
know that she is currently interacting, such as in the context of voice assistants that are constantly 
recording. As detailed in Section 2.1 there is some uncertainty regarding the degree and scope to 
which observed data should be fully made available according to Article 20 GDPR. Furthermore, as 
detailed in Section 1, this can potentially comprise large data sets, but technically it would be 
feasible (at least for large online service providers) to provide such data sets.  
 
Inferred data is derived through refinement and recombination from volunteered and observed 
data, e.g. by use of data analytics such as clustering, filtering or prediction. The result can be a 
complex preference profile of a consumer or a recommendation. Inferred data can actually already 
be – using the definition introduced in Section 4.1.1. – knowledge that can provide actionable 
insights. Thus, inferred data is ultimately the basis for competition between data-intensive firms, 
whereas volunteered data and observed data are the ‘raw data’ inputs.  
 
The distinction between volunteered, observed and inferred data, albeit not being a legal definition, 
is also important in the context of data portability. Article 20 GDPR clearly includes volunteered 
data, while it is commonly understood that inferred data is not included. With respect to observed 
data, it is currently not completely clear how far the users’ right to port data goes and whether and 
to what extent it is covered by the right to data portability (see Section 2.1.1). However, in its 
“Guidelines on the right to data portability” the European Data Protection Board suggests that 
observed data are to be included in the right to data portability.119  
 
4.1.3 Non-rivalry of data, and its limits 
Moreover, data is non-rival, which means that the same data can, in principle, be used by different 
entities at the same time. Moreover, the same data could also be shared and collected by different 
entities without depleting the source of data for others. For example, many observers could have 
collected the data on the light signals sent at the same time without interfering with the ability of 
others to do the same. Likewise, the data on the light signals could have been shared without 
having to give it up. But data is also excludable, which means that the data controller can impose 
technical or legal constraints to prevent sharing of data. Non-rivalry and excludability are distinct 
concepts and should not be seen as the two sides of the same medal. Although the consumption of 
data is non-rival, there may be economic impacts of data that are non-rival. This is sometimes 
overlooked in the policy debate. In the following, we therefore want to put non-rivalry of data (as 
opposed to the excludability of data) in perspective in order to emphasise benefits and a risks of 
data sharing and data portability. 
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4.1.3.1 Rivalry in the collection of data 
First, specific data (e.g., on products liked on a particular e-commerce site, or links clicked on a 
particular search engine) cannot just be collected by anyone interested. Just like a focused ray of 
light, e.g. emitted by a laser, may just be received in a particular location and not by a random 
observer. In this sense, although data consumption of data is non-rival, the collection of data may 
be rival and is therefore inherently concentrated.  
 
In this context it must be noted, however, that there is a lively debate with respect to the degree 
to which the collection of data is rival. On the hand, some scholars claim that data is ubiquitous, as 
consumers are willing to share their data over and over again with different services, frequently 
multi-home similar services, and that specialised data brokers make data available to everyone 
who wants to buy it (see, for example, Lambrecht and Tucker 2015120, and Tucker 2019121).  
 
This is contrasted by the empirical findings that – despite the multitude and variety of websites and 
online services available – consumers’ attention is highly concentrated on a few sites and even 
fewer firms. In other words, only those firms are in the right ‘location’ to actually collect consumer 
data at a large scale. For example, the European Commission found in the context of the Google 
AdSense case that Google had a market share of generally over 90% in 2016 the market for 
general search in all Member States.122  Similarly, in its investigation of Facebook, the German 
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) found that Facebook had market share in the market for 
social networks of over 95% (with respect to daily active users) in Germany in December 2018.123   
 
In similar vein, even fewer firms are currently able to collect tracking data across multiple sites. 
For example, Englehardt and Narayanan (2016) 124 measured which third-party web trackers were 
deployed at the top 1 million websites. They find that Alphabet/Google (with trackers deployed at 
about 70% of all sites), followed by Facebook (trackers deployed at about 30% of all sites), are 
also in a unique position to track users’ activity across various (third-party) websites. Very similar 
results are obtained by Ghostery, a browser extension that blocks third party trackers.125 The 
situation is likely to become even more pronounced as Google has recently announced to disallow 
third-party cookies in Google’s Chrome browser, which many view as a step that bolsters Google’s 
and Facebook’s dominance in web tracking (Financial Times, 2020126), because these companies 
have alternative means to track users across the web, e.g., through services such as ‘Google 
Analytics’ or ‘Login with Facebook’. 
 
                                               
 
 
120 Lambrecht, A. and Tucker, C.. Can Big Data Protect a Firm from Competition? (Dec. 18, 2015). Available at SSRN: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2705530  
121 Tucker, C. (2019). Digital data, platforms and the usual [antitrust] suspects: Network effects, switching costs, 
essential facility. Review of Industrial Organization, 54(4), 683-694. 




124 Englehardt, S., & Narayanan, A. (2016, October). Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis. In 
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125 See https://www.ghostery.com/study/ and Macbeth, S. (2017). Tracking the Trackers: Analyzing the Global 
Tracking Landscape with GhostRank. Available at: https://www.ghostery.com/wp-
content/themes/ghostery/images/campaigns/tracker-study/Ghostery_Study_-_Tracking_the_Trackers.pdf  
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Taken together, this already points to the conclusion that the collection of observed user data (as 
opposed to volunteered user data) is indeed often rival, because for key services (such as search, 
or social networking) the market is highly concentrated and only a few firms are able to track user 
activity across the web. Thus, observed data is not ubiquitously available, and it is also usually not 
feasible nor socially desirable to duplicate the collection of the same observed data. This would 
mean that users would have to conduct the same search, the same post or the same purchase on 
several platforms; and it would mean that even more web trackers are being built into the websites 
that we visit. Thus, rivalry in the collection of data is not necessarily a problem, but it does provide 
a strong rational for sharing data.  
 
4.1.3.2 Rivalry in deriving value from data 
Second, the economic value of data likely depends on how many others have access to the same 
data, or put more precisely, can derive the same insights from data. For example, both Ishihashi 
(2019)127 and Gu (2018)128 highlight by means of a game-theoretic model that the value of data 
collected from consumers may drop significantly (in their theoretical models to zero) if more than 
one firm possesses it.  
 
Once the data is created (e.g. generated by using the service of a firm, which has ‘paid’ for the 
data by offering a free service), consumers will give it up to a second firm, even at a ‘price’ close to 
zero, because each additional sharing of data does not bear opportunity costs. This is a direct 
consequence of the non-rivalry of data. This means that if data sharing is frictionless and bears 
zero transaction costs for consumers, firms eventually possess identical sets of data. A potential 
buyer of this data is only interested in acquiring such data once because each data set is a perfect 
substitute for the other. This means that firms engage in fierce price competition selling the data – 
known as Bertrand competition. Eventually they compete each other down to marginal costs, which 
means that they sell the data for a price close to zero. If, however, only one firm would have 
possessed the data, it could have demanded a non-zero price. In this sense, although the 
consumption of data is non-rival, the economic value that can be derived from data is rival. 
 
If taken literally, this provides a strong rational for not sharing data, as this would destroy any 
incentive to collect data in the first place. However, three important clarifications are in order.  
 
First, and foremost, the above argument does not differentiate between ‘data’ and ‘knowledge’, 
because it essentially only considers data intermediaries, which collect and sell raw data. Even 
though two firms may have access to the same raw data set (in terms of volunteered and observed 
data), they may derive different insights from it (‘inferred data’ or ‘knowledge’ in our terminology), 
which is ultimately the basis for competition. 
 
Second, and relatedly, the above argumentation has abstracted from cases where the data is not 
sold to third parties on some data market, but rather used internally (e.g. for marketing purposes 
or for improving the service quality)—or where data is combined with other data available to the 
firm and the enriched data set can be sold as a unique data set, overcoming the competition in the 
data market.  
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Third, the above argumentation has abstracted from transaction costs, such as additional privacy 
concerns of sharing the data set with another firm, or the effort in selling additional data in return 
for only a low additional benefit. If these transaction costs are non-negligible, this will reduce the 
non-rival nature of data sharing, which leads to less data sharing and eventually decreases the 
competition in the data market. 
 
Taken together, this means that more prevalent sharing of ‘raw’ user data, will likely render the 
market for data intermediaries, which simply acquire and sell raw data, but do not offer advanced 
analytics on such ‘raw’ data, more competitive and possibly unlucrative. However, this does not 
destroy the incentives to compete on the basis of insights derived from data. Rather, as raw data 
becomes more prevalent, the focus of competition is likely to move more from collection to 
analytics, which likely stimulates innovation rather than stifling it (see Section 4.3.2). Indeed, as 
data collection is inherently concentrated (see Section 4.1.3.1) and the services through which 
(observed) data is collected usually exhibit strong network effects (see Section 4.2.2), a stronger 
competition at the data analytics level (based on knowledge) seems much more feasible and 
desirable than competition at the data collection level. 
 
4.1.4 The quality of data, and its relationship to volunteered and observed data 
Volunteered, observed and inferred data are also useful concepts for discussing different qualities 
of data. Generally, the quality of data can be measured along the dimensions of  
 fitness for use (is the data suited to derive the desired insights?) 
 accuracy (does the data represent the facts?) 
 completeness (how many data points are missing?) 
 timeliness (how fast can data be collected and how quickly is it outdated?)  
 
Volunteered data is derived from direct human input. That is, this data may be inaccurate, e.g., 
because wrong information (e.g. a wrong email address, fake name or fake review) have been 
submitted intentionally or unintentionally. But often the accuracy of the volunteered data is also 
essential for the quality of the service, which provides consumers with an incentive to provide 
accurate data (e.g., a correct liking of songs in a music streaming service will trigger a better 
recommendation for new songs).  
 
Moreover, volunteered data is prone to being incomplete, and it may outdate relatively fast, 
because it is not automatically updated after it has been provided. However, volunteered data is 
usually structured, because it has been collected in a structured way, such as through forms, ‘like’ 
buttons, or on a rating scale. Thus, it can immediately be used as input to generate inferred data.   
 
By contrast, observed data is less prone to deliberate manipulation, because it is derived from 
actual behaviour and sensors. Moreover, observed data tends to be more complete and timelier, 
because it is recorded automatically. The accuracy and fitness for use is often very context 
dependent. For example, click data from an e-commerce session can be very noisy and sparse, 
because the user might just be browsing through random products and in each product category 
only very few products are explored. In another session, the similar click data can be very accurate 
and dense, as a consumer explores several similar products and puts some of them in the shopping 
basket, but finally only buys one. Similarly, data from sensors (e.g., GPS sensors) can be highly 
accurate at times and inaccurate at other times, depending, for example, on geography and 
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Quality of data with respect to fitness for use also depends highly on the context. Highly accurate 
GPS data, for example, may be necessary to identify which products a consumer was interested in 
when visiting a department store, whereas coarser data may still be acceptable to identify which 
stores a consumer has visited in a mall.  In any case, observed data is often less structured and 
must be cleaned and structured in a way that allows to derive actionable knowledge. 
 
Finally, the quality of inferred data depends not only on the quality of the observed and 
volunteered data, but also on the amount of observed and volunteered data. With respect to the 
analysis of data, empirical studies suggest that in many (big) data analytics applications, (i) there 
is a minimum required scale, (ii) there are benefits from larger data sets, and (iii) these benefits 
are marginally decreasing as data sets become very large. More precisely, Junqué de Fortuny et al. 
(2013)129 and Martens et al. (2016)130 demonstrate that prediction accuracy increases for larger 
data sets of fine-grained user behavior data (observed data). Whereas benefits decrease 
marginally as prediction accuracy approaches the theoretical benchmark (cf. Li, Ling, Wang, 
2016131), the studies show this convergence is not yet reached in many popular application 
settings. Furthermore, for the online advertising industry, Lewis and Rao (2015) 132 find that only 
very large amounts of data allow firms to measure whether advertising campaigns are indeed 
successful. Thus, empirical studies and general indications point to the presence of scale economies 
from data collection and data analysis.  
 
Consequently, having access to more data (e.g., not only volunteered but also observed data) will, 
in many applications, yield a better quality of the inferred data, i.e. the actionable knowledge, and 
thus offer higher profit opportunities for firms. Therefore, the application scope of data portability, 
i.e. whether it is restricted to volunteered data or also encompasses observed data, is also crucial 
from an economic perspective.  
 
4.2 Data portability and competition 
 
The previous subsection highlighted that  
- particularly observed data is a valuable raw input for data-intensive business models in the 
digital economy 
- the collection of observed data in the digital economy is inherently concentrated and only a 
few digital firms are in a unique position to collect it. 
 
In this context, the question arises how newcomers and start-ups may get access to the required 
observed data, in order to be able to compete on the basis of inferred data, i.e. knowledge and 
insights generated from these raw inputs. More generally, this raises the question how and if data 
portability indeed increases the competitiveness of digital markets.  
 
                                               
 
 
129  Junqué de Fortuny, E., Martens, D., & Provost, F. (2013). Predictive modeling with big data: is bigger really better? 
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First, we take the perspective of a consumer, and highlight that switching to a new service may 
impose two types of ‘costs’ that can result in consumer lock-in. The first type of cost is a 
transaction cost from switching. The second type of cost is related to network effects. We describe 
both in turn. Then, we discuss in more detail why firms may not want to import data from other 
providers, thus rendering consumers’ right to export data mute for the purpose of switching 
providers. 
 
4.2.1 Data portability and data-induced switching costs 
It is often argued that consumers do not switch from one digital service to another because they 
shy away from the transaction costs to give away their (volunteered) data again at the new 
service. This seems especially problematic in cases where large amounts of data have been 
volunteered over a long time in which the current service was used. For example, in the case 
where thousands of songs have been liked while using an online streaming service, liking the same 
songs again at a new service seems an unreasonable burden. This transaction cost is a classic 
switching cost, i.e. a fixed cost for setting up a service that occurs only once. When a consumer 
evaluates two services—the one that she is currently using, and the new one—the difference in 
expected utility must at least exceed the switching cost, in order for the consumers to switch.  
 
The classic literature on switching costs (see, e.g., Klemperer 1987a133) finds that switching costs 
can constitute a significant barrier to entry, shielding incumbents from competition. In digital 
markets, switching cost may vary substantially depending on the context. However, the classic 
literature also finds that when established services compete for customers in the presence of 
switching costs, then competition is fierce for ‘new’ customers, whereas ‘old’ customers tend to be 
exploited (see, e.g., Klemperer 1987b134; Farrell and Shapiro 1988135). However, in the long run, 
markets tend to be less competitive in the presence of switching costs (see, e.g., Beggs and 
Klemperer, 1992136). 
 
Generally, services whose quality depend to a high degree on customisation and personalisation 
(e.g., services in which recommendations play a significant role) are more prone to be subject to 
switching costs. However, often it may not just be volunteered data that constitutes a switching 
cost, but also the observed data. For example, the current music streaming service may also have 
recorded which songs where actually listened to, how often each song was played, for how long, 
and at what time of the day. Like the volunteered data, this observed data can be a very useful 
input for the next music streaming service. 
 
The right to data portability can lower these switching costs by making the volunteered data and 
observed data readily available in a “structured, commonly used and machine-readable format” to 
the consumer, who can then pass it on to the new provider. Thus, in light of the classic switching 
cost literature, the right to data portability can make digital markets more competitive in the long 
run and lower entry barriers for new service providers. This is commonly viewed as beneficial to 
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consumer welfare and one of the strongest economic arguments for the right to data portability as 
it is currently implemented in the GDPR. 
 
However, more recently a new strand of economic literature has re-investigated the classic results 
and specifically considered the welfare implications of the right to data portability. In a game-
theoretic model, Wohlfarth (2019)137 highlights that the right to data portability can have an effect 
on the amount of data this is collected by data-intensive firms. Without the right to data 
portability, market entrants are forced to design services that economise on the use of data in 
order to be able to attract consumers. However, as data can be easily ported to the entrant, the 
new provider has less incentives to economise on data use and increases the amount of data 
collected. In this sense, the GDPR’s right to data portability (Article 20) runs contrary to the 
GDPR’s principle of data minimisation (Article 5.1c); not only from a legal point of view, as pointed 
out in Section 2.1.3, but also with respect to the economic incentives of data collection. Wohlfarth 
shows that this economic trade-off can eventually lead to a reduction in consumer surplus.  
 
In a similar vein, Krämer and Stüdlein (2019) also analyse the economic effects of data portability 
on market entry in a game-theoretic model. They focus on the firms’ incentives to disclose user 
data, e.g., in the context of targeted advertising, with and without the right to data portability. 
They show that the right to data portability is likely to benefit the ‘old’ customers of the incumbent, 
especially those that do switch to the new provider, as switching costs are reduced and competition 
is increases. However, the ‘new’ customers of the entrant, i.e. those that were not previously 
customers of the incumbent, are likely to be worse off, because the entrant’s competitive position 
is strengthened under the new right to data portability. Without data portability, the entrant would 
have competed more fiercely for these new customers. In reverse, this means that its customers 
are worse off than without data portability. Again, this highlights that not all consumers need to 
benefit from a right to data portability – although this right unambiguously lowers switching costs.  
 
Despite these nuances, if data portability indeed lowers switching costs, this is likely to increase 
the competitiveness of markets. However, not the least, this will also depend on whether 
consumers actually make use of data portability, and whether data is actually imported by other 
services. 
 
4.2.2 Data portability and network effects 
Network effects arise whenever a consumer’s value of a good or service depends on how many 
other consumers are using the same good or service. Network effects are ubiquitous in digital 
markets, and often services are explicitly designed to incorporate network effects. For example, in 
social networks, network effects arise, because participation in the network is more valuable the 
more other people are also using the same social network. This is a direct network effect. But more 
than often, indirect network effects are present. In this case the value of the service increases 
because of the presence of more complementors to the service. For example, an operating system 
is valuable mostly due to the availability of software complements that run on this operating 
system. Likewise, an e-commerce website may be valuable to a consumer due to the number of 
product reviews on that website, which depend only indirectly on the number of users. Indirect 
network effects are also at the core of platform markets (a.k.a. two-sided markets), which bring 
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together two distinct user groups (such as buyers and sellers). At least one of the two groups 
values the presence of the other group on the platform, thereby creating an indirect network 
effect. A prototypical example is an app store, where consumers value the presence of many app 
developers, and, in reverse, app developers value the presence of many consumers.  
 
Network effects are important in the context of data portability and the competitiveness of markets 
for two main reasons.   
 
4.2.2.1 Data portability and user-side network effects 
First, network effects create a coordination problem. Because the value of the service depends 
directly or indirectly on how many others are using it, consumers want to be where everybody else 
is. This also creates a lock-in situation, distinct from that of simple switching costs, because 
switching a provider seems only reasonable if everyone switches at the same time. It is important 
to note that, contrary to the case of data-induced switching costs, data portability does not 
alleviate this type of lock-in. This would require some (protocol) interoperability (see Crémer, de 
Montjoye and Schweitzer 2019) of the services, whereby services interoperate to a degree where 
ultimately users can interact seamlessly albeit being on different networks – like users of different 
telecom networks can communicate with each other. Then users can switch to a new provider 
without losing access to the network effect exerted by users who remain with the old provider. 
Consider a social network for example. Even if a user would be able to take its data to a new social 
network, it would still not be able to interact with the users that remained on the old network. 
Indeed, in this context, it has been argued that “identity portability” (Gans 2018138) or “social 
graph portability” (Zingales and Rolnik, 2017139)—both a form of protocol interoperability—would 
be desirable to overcome user-side network effects Identity portability means that a person can 
switch to a new network and take her identity with her, so that all messages related to that person 
are forwarded to the new network, and vice versa. The idea of identity portability is thus 
comparable to interconnection in conjunction with number portability on telecom networks.  
 
However, demanding (protocol) interoperability over and beyond (data) portability also has some 
caveats, especially with respect to the need for regulatory oversight (like in telecoms networks), 
and the ensuing risk of barriers to innovation due to the necessity to remain within the standard 
for interoperability. As others have noted (see, e.g., Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer 2019), 
this seems warranted only in specific applications such as text messaging services and social 
networks, where the benefits of interoperability (through increasing the network effect and 
competition in the market) are likely to outweigh the risk (of reduced innovation and competition 
for the market). 
 
Finally, there is a noteworthy interaction between network effects and switching costs, laid out in 
Suleymanova & Wey (2011). Markets with strong network effects tend to monopolise, because 
consumers tend to gravitate to the service or platform that already exhibits the largest network 
effects. In other words, once a critical mass of users has been reached, markets tip towards the 
largest player. Switching costs can dampen this process, because they create an economic friction 
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(transaction cost) that prevents customers from switching to the service with higher network 
effects as easily. In this vein, switching costs may allow two networks to co-exist at the same time. 
However, this is usually not an efficient situation in the presence of network effects. Moreover, the 
argument rests on the assumption that there are two services, albeit with different market shares, 
which both have a viable and stable user base. In practice, many digital markets with strong 
network effects have already tipped and new entrants do not have a viable and stable user base so 
that switching costs (or non-portability) would protect them from churn. Thus, we argue that in 
many relevant scenarios the interaction of data portability and network effects is not anti-
competitive. But as laid out above, it is also not pro-competitive in the sense that data portability 
affects user-side network effects per se. Rather, data portability may impact analytics-based 
network effects, which may then have a pro-competitive effect. We describe this in the following. 
 
4.2.2.2 Data portability and analytics-based network effects 
Second, indirect network effects can also arise with respect to data analytics capabilities. Here 
network effects yield a positive feedback loop for algorithmic learning that can constitute an 
effective entry barrier (see Lerner 2014140 for a thorough discussion): The more consumers are 
using a service, the more (volunteered and observed) data is created on which analytics can be 
performed and algorithms can be trained, which in turn results in an improvement of the service 
(e.g., better recommendations, better search results), which in turn leads to more consumers. For 
example, a dominant search engine is likely to provide better results simply because it records 
more search queries (volunteered data) and records more clicks on search results (observed data), 
which can then be used to derive better results lists for future searches.  
 
This means, in this case barriers to entry are not created by switching costs in the narrow sense 
(indeed switching a search engine hardly entails any switching costs due to setting up the service), 
nor are they due to a lack of access to the network of users (on the same or the other market 
side). Here it is rather the lack of access to the data that is created by fellow users – a type of 
indirect network effect – that creates a barrier to entry. This lack of data limits the ability of a new 
service provider to compete on the basis of algorithmic insights and data analytics, i.e. on the basis 
of inferred data or knowledge. This argument is explored more formally, for example, in Hagiu and 
Wright (2020)141, who show that this competitive advantage of the incumbent prevails under 
various assumptions about the shape of the learning curve from data. Moreover, Schaefer, Sapi 
and Lorincz (2018) 142  provide empirical evidence that such network effects in algorithmic learning 
exist in the context of search engines.  
 
Thus, if enough users would consent to a transfer of their raw data, and if it were possible to 
continuously transfer data through a standardised interface (API), then data portability could 
potentially promote entry and competition. It is important to highlight that the provision of data to 
competitors would be initiated by the consumers and, in each case, only entail the data of that 
consumers. This is very different to an access request entailing (anonymised) input data across a 
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large number of users, initiated by another firm, e.g., by a competitor under the essential facilities 
doctrine. Although some commentators highlight that such access to input data may be a 
possibility to restore market contestability (e.g., by Argenton and Prüfer, 2012143, Krämer and 
Wohlfarth, 2018144 and Schweitzer et al., 2018145), the focus of the present report is on user-
initiated data portability. The advantage of data portability is that also personally identifiable data 
can be transferred, and thus there is no trade-off between competition and privacy, which is 
inherent to access requests that are not user-initiated. However, at the same time, it is unlikely 
that all users initiate a transfer of their data. Thus, the data set that is ported under data 
portability is likely to be more detailed on specific data subjects, but less representative for the 
user base as a whole. Whether or not such a data set is useful for a competing or complementing 
firm, is context specific and depends on the degree to which consumers make use of data 
portability, of course.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention in this context that data portability may also be viewed with 
caution, because this can lead to situations in which ultimately consumers and competitors are 
worse off. In particular, Lam and Liu (2020)146 argue by means of a game-theoretic model that the 
right to data portability encourages consumers to reveal more data to the incumbent, because 
consumer are less concerned about data-induced switching costs that may arise later when 
considering to switch to a new market entrant (see Section 4.2.1). However, as consumers reveal 
more data, they also create a higher data analytics network effect at the incumbent, which indeed 
strengthens the competitive position of the incumbent vis-à-vis a new market entrant, and raises 
entry barriers. While data portability facilitates switching (which lowers entry barriers and raises 
consumers’ surplus), this effect can be completely offset by the increase in the data analytics 
network effect (which raises entry barriers and may prevent efficient entry). In summary, the 
authors therefore conclude that data portability can have an adverse effect on entry and long-run 
efficiency, although (or indeed because) data portability lowers switching costs. Note that this 
arguments rests strongly on the assumption that data portability leads to a different data 
revelation behaviour of consumers at the incumbent. 
 
4.3 Data portability and innovation incentives 
 
The previous subsection has focused on the impact of data portability on competition and 
contestability of markets, i.e. adopted a more static efficiency perspective. We now turn to a 
dynamic efficiency perspective and consider the impact of data portability, and more generally of 
data access on innovation incentives.  
 
There has been a lively scholarly and policy debate about data access and innovation (see, e.g., 
Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019147; Furman et al. 2018148), which we do not intend to 
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repeat here. However, we wish to highlight the main trade-offs involved in order to lay the 
groundwork to derive appropriate policy recommendations in the context of data portability and 
data interoperability. 
 
With regard to innovation, it is important to differentiate between the innovation incentives and 
capabilities of the firm that provides access to data and the firms that receive access to data. 
Moreover, it is important to differentiate whether such data is used to compete with the data 
provider or whether it is used for other purposes, such as offering complementary or completely 
new services. We consider these scenarios in turn. 
 
4.3.1 Innovation by the incumbent: Conventional wisdom and kill zones 
Although the consumption of data is non-rival (although there may be rivalry in the collection and 
monetisation of data, see in Section 4.1.3), data is excludable, which – in an economic sense – 
means that a firm can exert exclusion rights on data assets. Without mandated access to data, 
data-intensive firms can utilise their economic control over data in order to make economic profits 
– be it by selling access to data or by using the data to improve their product or service in order to 
gain a competitive advantage. It is, by now, evident that data-rich firms can be highly profitable 
and this creates an economic incentive to invest in data collection and analysis. This spurs 
innovation, ranging from innovative services (that allow for a collection of data) to innovative data 
storage and data analytics. In this view, losing control of those data would lead to what economists 
call a “hold-up problem”. That is, the lack of sufficient appropriability on data renders the economic 
benefits of data uncertain and leads to a reduction in investment and innovation. This is, of course, 
conventional wisdom among economists, the very reason why intellectual property rights exist (i.e. 
a legal instrument for data excludability), and an argument that is not specific to data. In this 
sense, innovation incentives in the context of data are particularly strong when data can be used 
exclusively, and if in consequence a market can be monopolised. 
 
In a similar vein, it is conventional wisdom in economics that there is a (non-linear) relationship 
between innovation incentives and competition, although there is continued research on the topic. 
Innovation is a means to provide a better service or product and to differentiate from competitors. 
This tends to increase profits and provides innovation incentives. In line with an Arrowian view, in 
a monopolistic environment, where high entry barriers already exist (be it by network effects or 
switching costs, or something else), innovation incentives tend to be low, because there is no 
competitive advantage to be gained from innovation. But in line with a Schumpeterian view, in 
markets with very high degrees of competition, innovation incentives also tend to be low as well, 
because innovation rents are quickly competed away and firms are often lacking sufficient scale for 
innovation activities.  
 
Taking both arguments together, and in line with ample empirical evidence, innovation incentives 
tend to be the highest in oligopolies with only a few firms (see, e.g., Aghion et al. 2005)149. In this 
sense, if data portability indeed induces more competition in digital markets with high data-induced 
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entry barriers, then this would likely increase incentives to innovate. In particular, in the context of 
digital markets, innovation incentives are particularly high if a market has not yet tipped and there 
is still competition for the market; or, possibly even more importantly, if digital markets were 
indeed contestable. This would mean that, despite a de-facto monopoly, entry barriers remain low 
and the incumbent needs to constantly defend its incumbency through innovation.  
 
There is some doubt, however, as to whether the market inhabited by some big tech firms are 
indeed contestable and whether data portability would indeed lead to more competition in 
established markets. On the one hand, we have already detailed that data portability cannot 
overcome user-induced network effects per se (see 4.2.2), such that important barriers to entry 
remain, irrespective of the degree of data portability, if a new service were to compete head-to-
head. On the other hand, there is growing empirical evidence that some firms may have 
established ‘kill-zones’ around their core business model (see, e.g., Kamepalli et al. 2020150 and 
Scott Morton et al. 2019151 for a thorough discussion, but also related news reports152). This means 
that innovative start-ups, which may become competitors to a big tech firm’s data-centric business 
model, may either be bought by the big tech firm, or it is quick to incorporate the innovation into 
its own service. In the latter case the incumbent has a comparative advantage relative to start-ups 
or smaller firms due to its deep financial pockets, and existing economies of scale as well as 
network effects (e.g., in data analytics). In this way the incumbent can successfully prevent 
customer churn and, at the same time, deny start-ups a viable and stable customer base. Such ‘kill 
zones’ also seem to have an effect on the venture capital market, where start-ups that 
complement the incumbent’s business model are more likely to receive venture capital than start-
ups that challenge the incumbent (for a discussion see, e.g., Smith, 2018153, Rinehardt, 2018154 
and Kamepalli et al. 2020155). For the same reasons, there is also a growing consensus that data-
intensive mergers should be reviewed more carefully and with adapted tools by competition 
authorities, (see, e.g., Bourreau and de Streel, 2020156; Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer 
2019; Motta and Peitz 2020157; Scott-Morton et al. 2018). In this context, recall also our discussion 
in Section 2.4 on the (high) legal barriers with respect to access to data under the essential 
facilities doctrine. 
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In summary, this means that, irrespective of the degree of data portability, we conclude that data 
portability would lead to more or less competition and innovation in established digital markets per 
se. It may, however, spur innovation in complementary and new digital markets, which we argue 
next. 
 
4.3.2 Innovation at the service level vs. innovation at the analytics level 
In Section 4.2.2.2 we have already discussed the positive feedback loop that provides an 
incumbent digital service provider with a competitive advantage in terms of data analytics 
capabilities. We now return to this issue from an innovation perspective. Data (volunteered and 
observed) is often accumulated as the results of innovation at the service or product level, which 
led consumers to use and thereby to contribute personal data. By contrast, inferred data is the 
result of innovation at the data analytics level. An important observation in this context is that, 
given the raw data, it does not necessarily require an innovation at the service level per se to 
achieve an innovation at the data analytics level.  
 
However, as discussed previously, innovations with respect to inferred data (i.e. data analytics 
innovations) rest upon the input of raw data (observed and volunteered data), which typically can 
only be amassed if the firm also runs a successful service at the service or product level. This 
creates a virtuous innovation cycle for incumbents. Innovations at the analytics level facilitate 
innovation at the service level, which again spur innovations at the analytics level. While there are 
certainly inherent efficiencies in this virtuous cycle, it may be viewed as problematic that 
innovation can to a large degree only occur ‘in house’, whereas truly innovative ideas often come 
from outsiders, often (business) users (see, e.g., van Hippel, 2005158).  
 
Indeed, innovation at the data analytics level may spur innovation at the service level in a 
completely different domain.159 For example, Google Flu Trends160 exemplified that search data 
cannot just be used to improve the search engine’s results, but also to predict the spread of the 
flu. But it has also been demonstrated that there was significant scope for improvement over 
Google’s algorithm (see, e.g., Lampos et al. 2015161).  
 
Similarly, an innovation at the service level may not get off the ground, if it is not fed with 
sufficient raw data to begin with. For example, collaborative-filtering based recommender systems 
suffer from a well-known ‘cold-start problem’ (see, e.g., Bobadilla et al. 2012162). That is, in order 
to provide good results, the recommender system needs to be fed with sufficient user data 
(observed and volunteered data) in order to be able to find similarities between users from which 
recommendations can then be derived. For example, suppose it were an innovation at the service 
level to offer customers personalised recommendations for clothing and styling. If the idea is found 
to be intriguing enough by potential customers, it would – at least at the beginning – not be 
required to be very innovative at the analytics level, because collaborative-filtering algorithms for 
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such a purpose would be readily available. The main challenge would be to overcome the cold-start 
problem, however, so that if new customers try the service for the first time, it would offer useful 
recommendations already. 
 
Thus, there is reason to believe that innovation activities would be significantly increased, if it were 
possible that innovation at service level and innovation at the analytics level could occur 
independently, i.e. in different organisations. Thanks to the non-rivalry of data, this would not 
mean that the current data controller loses access to the data, and thus, can continue to be 
innovative both at the service and the analytics level, taking advantage of the virtuous feedback 
cycle.  
 
4.3.3 Lack of empirical studies on data portability and innovation 
While it is without doubt that we have seen an unprecedented wave of innovations in digital 
markets, the above arguments provide some reasoning that the level of innovation could be even 
higher, if data portability were more prevalent. To be clear, we are not aware of conclusive 
empirical evidence that has tested this hypothesis. In fact, while there is a substantial legal 
literature on data portability (see Section 2), and some theoretical work (see Section 4.2), we are 
not aware of any empirical studies on how data portability specifically has altered competition or 
innovation incentives in digital markets. It is probably also difficult to establish a conclusive cause-
and-effect relationship at all, as data portability usually comes in package with other privacy rights, 
and because in the dynamic environment of digital markets it is very difficult to establish the 
counterfactual for innovation.  
 
There is some tentative evidence, however, in the case of Open Banking, which is probably one of 
the most important natural experiments in this context. Although there was competition between 
banks, the emergence of new financial services (fin techs) has spurred following the availability of 
API-based common interfaces that made continuous data portability possible163. This seems to 
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5. The economics of Personal Management Information 
Systems 
 
Personal Information Management Systems (PIMS) have been introduced mainly from a technical 
perspective in Section 1. Given their possibly central role in the context of data portability, we now 
discuss PIMS from an economic perspective. Particularly, we will focus on the questions whether 
and under which conditions PIMS may indeed be economically sustainable.  
 
5.1 Key functionalities of PIMS 
 
As highlighted in Section 0, PIMS come in a variety of shapes, but their central premise is to 
empower users to regain control over their personal data a variety of otherwise decentralised 
services in one central place. The core vision is to provide users with a central dashboard, where 
they can grant and revoke their consent for data processing — at a fine-grained level – with any 
given data controller, and exercise their rights, especially the right to data portability (Art. 20 
GDPR) and the right to erasure (Art. 17 GDPR). Hence, in policy and technical circles, PIMS are 
often regarded as the silver bullet, which is the missing building block for a fair and transparent 
data economy. Accordingly, associations like the MyData movement164, which originated in Finnish 
policy circles in 2014, are currently gaining increasing attention. DG Connect published a report on 
PIMS already in 2016165 and the idea is still prominently discussed in the European Commissions’ 
recently adopted Data Strategy166. The idea of PIMS is much older, however, and dates back to the 
mid 90s when Laudon (1996)167 envisioned the creation of a national information market, where 
data subjects can deposit their information in bank-like institutions and are compensated for the 
use of their data. 
 
More specifically, according to a review of proto-typical PIMS by MyData168, the key functionalities 
of PIMS are 
 Identity management: Authentication at various services 
 Permission management: Overview of data transactions and connections, including 
management of legal rights and consent 
 Service management: Linking various data sources 
 Value exchange: Accounting and capturing the value of data, including remuneration 
(personal data broker) 
 Data model management: Managing semantic conversions (schemas) from one data model 
to another 
 Personal data transfers: Implementing interfaces (APIs) for standardised and secure data 
exchange between various data sources and data recipients 
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 Personal data storage: Storing data from various sources, including data generated directly 
at the PIMS. 
 Governance support: Ensuring compliance with legal frameworks 
 Logging and accountability: Keeping historic logs of any data access and exchange facilitated 
by the PIMS 
 
However, it is not always useful for PIMS to offer all of these functionalities. For example, as we 
will highlight below, whether or not PIMS should engage in value exchange (which we denote as 
personal data brokers) is debatable. It is also noteworthy that in the context of the digital 
economy, some of the key functionalities of PIMS are currently offered by large digital platforms 
directly. For example, the Data Transfer Project (see 0), which is backed by some of the largest 
digital platform provider, is a PIMS focused on personal data transfers and data model 
management. But possibly more importantly, large online platforms also offer online identity 
management solutions, i.e. registration and authentication of a user at various online services. For 
example, this is currently offered like Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, LinkedIn or Twitter. 
Thereof “Sign in with Google” and “Sign in with Facebook” are probably the most well-known.169  
 
This begs the question whether, in the context of the digital economy, PIMS stand a chance to 
operate independently of the big tech firms, as neutral stand-alone brokers that can truly empower 
users to exercise control over their personal data. We explore this issue from an economic 
perspective in more detail below. This means that users see added value in the adoption of a PIMS, 
and that the PIMS can find a sustainable business model. We see problems on both accounts. 
 
5.2 Lack of (de-facto) standards and APIs 
 
The central premise of PIMS for users is that they offer a centralised dashboard that seamlessly 
integrates with the various services that they are using, offering key functionalities such as identity 
management, permission management and data transfers. This requires a common set of de-fact 
standards and high-performance APIs (see Section 0) through which a PIMS would be able to 
access the various services and users’ data.  
 
However, to date, such common standards are lacking. Instead, data integration is rather done 
through individual solutions, customised for each service, either using existing APIs (with rate and 
other access limitations) or through web scraping. Some view this as a central role of PIMS, 
because in this way PIMS enable some limited portability in an otherwise incompatible and non-
standardised data ecosystem.  
 
However, we view this with some scepticisms, because this approach is not scalable to a large set 
of services, and access hinges on the goodwill of the data provider, who may at any time make 
changes to the data access or undermine it. At the same time, without a significant user base, any 
given PIMS does not have sufficient leverage to set a standard on its own.  
 
By contrast, large digital platforms, such as Google or Facebook, have successfully leveraged their 
vast user base to induce many independent service providers to implement their standards, such 
as their single-sign-on solutions.  
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As explained in Section 0, in theory, widespread availability of APIs or a common export standard 
would alleviate this problem, because then network effects do not matter anymore. As long as all 
entities (PIMS and data controllers) can communicate thanks to common standards and interfaces, 
even a PIMS with only a few customers would be able to offer its consumers a comprehensive 
service. Several PIMS could even co-exist and thus PIMS could even compete for customers, as 
switching would be easy, thanks to the common standards, APIs, and the right to port volunteered 
data.170 In this context, one must differentiate, however, at least between the 
 standards for managing consent 
 standards for authenticating the user and  
 standards for actually transmitting and possibly storing personal data 
 
in order to enable key functionalities of PIMS. While OAuth (2.0) seems to be the de-facto standard 
for authentication, which is also used by “Login with Google” or “Login with Facebook” as well as in 
the Data Transfer Project, there are many implementation details that yet need to be considered 
(see Section 1), and even with a common standard, centralised controlled could be retained, e.g., 
through the centralised control of crucial resources (such as token management in the context of 
OAuth) and rate management of APIs.  Yet, in the other two domains even more isolated 
implementation approaches exist (see Section 0), and there is currently an ongoing development 
and debate how to design such standards. Recently, solutions based on blockchain designs have 
surged (see, e.g., Zyskind and Nathan 2015171 as well as several industry initiatives172), because 
these promise a decentralised framework that could do without a centralised control and oversight. 
It yet remains to be seen, however, whether these solutions are practical and scalable.  
 
5.3 Lack of sustainable business models 
 
Second, there seems to be a lack of a sustainable business models for PIMS that is not build on 
selling users’ data. Indeed, if we look beyond the need for standards and API access to connect a 
user’s various data sources in a centralised PIMS, the question arises how the business model of a 
privately-financed ‘neutral’ data broker can ever be sustainable. In principle, there are three 
potential sources of revenues for a purely privately-financed PIMS, data markets, data controllers 
and consumers. If all of these turn out to be not sustainable, there may also be a role for public 
subsidies. We discuss each of these possibilities in turn. 
 
5.3.1 Generating revenue from data-driven services or on data markets 
By data markets we mean any market where (access to) data or insights derived from data can be 
monetised. In particular, this can be advertising markets, the market for customer analytics 
services, and the market for data intermediaries (selling access to raw data). PIMS would then 
generate revenues in much the same way as the original data controllers (such as Google or 
Facebook) from which the data was transferred to the PIMS. Why would consumers then want to 
transfer their data to the PIMS at all? We see three reasons: 
                                               
 
 
170 Clearly, consent notifications given to a PIMS would qualify as volunteered data. 
171 Zyskind, G., & Nathan, O. (2015, May). Decentralizing privacy: Using blockchain to protect personal data. In 2015 
IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (pp. 180-184). IEEE.  
172 For example, by Microsoft (https://qz.com/989761/microsoft-msft-thinks-blockchain-tech-could-solve-one-of-the-
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First, in this way consumers could exert some competitive pressure on data-rich platforms. In 
theory, PIMS could even have better data on its customers than any given data controller, 
precisely because PIMS have the possibility to aggregate data from various data controllers. That 
is, data sets might have greater ‘depth’ (i.e. more variables/columns per observation/row). In 
practice this is not very likely, however. At least not compared to large online platforms which have 
the ability to track consumers’ activity across multiple websites and services. In reverse, PIMS can 
only sell data from consumers that use the PIMS, and thus, data sets have less ‘breadth’ (i.e. less 
observations/rows). Even if the PIMS would have the same ability to generate insights from data 
and to offer data-intensive services, the extent to which PIMS can indeed exert competitive 
pressure and be a successful actor on the data markets is not clear. In this context, it is important 
to recall our discussion on the potentially fierce competition that could come along with selling 
identical data sets (see Section 4.1.3.2). 
 
Second, users would have more control over where and which data is sold (data trust). This could 
be an incentive to transfer data to the PIMS in its own right. However, this additional control and 
transparency relates only with respect to the additional data sales by the PIMS, and not those done 
by the data controller from which the data was transferred. Thus, if privacy is of concern to users, 
they first create an additional problem (selling more of their data) which they can then partially fix. 
This does not seem to be a very convincing incentive for consumers to transfer data. This may 
change, however, if, like in the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), consumers would 
additionally have the right to opt out of the sale of their personal data at the original data 
controller. Precisely, CCPA (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.135(a)(1))173 states that a business that falls 
under the CCPA174 shall  
 
“Provide a clear and conspicuous link on the business’s Internet homepage, titled “Do Not Sell My 
Personal Information,” to an Internet Web page that enables a consumer, or a person authorized by 
the consumer, to opt-out of the sale of the consumer’s personal information. A business shall not 
require a consumer to create an account in order to direct the business not to sell the consumer’s 
personal information.” 
 
If consumer had the same right under European law, this would mean that a consumer could deny 
the original data controller to sell its data, and transfer it to a PIMS, who would then sell the data 
respecting the user’s fine-granular control and consent options. This would indeed offer consumers 
more control over which data and to whom data is sold. PIMS could even compete among each 
other on the basis of finer control rights for the sale of data.  
 
However, this would likely induce the original data controller to also offer consumers finer control 
rights with respect to how their data is sold – instead of just the full opt-out mandated by law. 
This, in turn, would give consumers less incentives to port their data to the PIMS in the first place. 
Consequently, from this view – and only if CCPA-like regulation would be adopted in Europe as well 
– PIMS could induce large online platforms to give users more control rights over how their data is 
used, because the market would become more contestable; but under this view, PIMS would 




174 The CCPA applies to any business, including any for-profit entity that collects consumers' personal data, which does 
business in California, and satisfies at least one of the following thresholds: i) Has annual gross revenues in excess of 
USD 25 million; ii) Buys or sells the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers or households; or iii) Earns 






June 2020 – Making data Portability More Effective for The Digital Economy     70/101 
probably never actually have a significant amount of customers, and would eventually only serve 
as a competitive threat to achieve market contestability according to the contestable markets 
theory (Baumol, 1985)175. It is questionable whether this business model is sustainable, especially 
if setting up a PIMS involves significant fixed costs or venture capital, because PIMS would 
constantly be in a potential ‘kill zone’. Clearly, everything else being equal, consumers would find it 
easier to control their data directly at the original platform than to port it to a PIMS first. This gives 
the original platform a competitive advantage over a PIMS that would allow it to foreclose the PIMS 
from entry. Nevertheless, the threat of entry by a PIMS remains, depending on shadow costs of 
entry, and disciplines the incumbent accordingly. 
 
Third, and probably the most important incentive for consumers to transfer data to a PIMS under 
this revenue-generation scheme, is that the PIMS could pay consumers for their data. In other 
words, the PIMS would become a Personal Data Broker (PDB), who sells personal data on behalf of 
the users, and offers users financial rewards in return (also called value exchange above). 
Consequently, PDBs are not just promising users more control over who they sell the data to, but 
foremost that users can financially participate from the commercialisation of their data. This is also 
the vision that was expressed already by Laudon (1996) and later by Larnier (2014)176, who also 
coined the term “data as labor” (Arrieta-Ibarra et al., 2018)177. Indeed, such PDB business models 
are currently being pursued in practice, such as the joint venture between digi.me and UBDI 
(which stands for “Universal Basic Data Income”)178. However, similar previous PDBs, such as 
Datacoup179, have already failed and paid consumers only minimal rewards. According to 
Wikipedia180 in the trial phase, Datacoup offered each user up to USD 5 per month, and in the beta 
phase up to USD 8 per month in return for access to user accounts of various social networks such 
as Facebook and LinkedIn, as well as to debit and credit card transactions. However, in November 
2019 Datacoup announced its users that it is closing down, and had actually never sold any of their 
data up to this point. Instead, all payments had been made from the Datacoup treasury account. 
Other examples of PDBs are people.io (who seem to face similar issues181 as Datacoup), Datum182 
(where data can be sold in return for cryptocurrency), ItsMyData183 (which plans to pay consumers 
in the future, but does not do so yet184), and Wibson185 (where users can earn tokens that can be 
redeemed in a marketplace; the market place has not been launched yet, however186). Even the 
large telecom operator Telefonica has announced a PIMS with PDB187 in 2017, which they call 
‘Aura’ (in fact a partnership with people.io), but this project has never taken off the ground. 
 
Thus, while there is an emerging offer of PIMS that promise consumers to redeem them for their 
data (in the future), none of them currently seem to have a sustainable business model. Rewards 
                                               
 
 
175 Baumol, W. J. (1986). Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of industry structure. Microtheory: 
applications and origins, 40-54. 
176 Lanier, J. (2014). Who owns the future?. Simon and Schuster. 
177 Arrieta-Ibarra, I., Goff, L., Jiménez-Hernández, D., Lanier, J., & Weyl, E. G. (2018, May). Should We Treat Data as 
Labor? Moving beyond" Free". In AEA Papers and Proceedings (Vol. 108, pp. 38-42). 
178 See https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/an-app-that-pays-you-for-your-data-yes-actually/ 
179 See https://www.datacoup.com  
180 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datacoup  
181 See https://uk.trustpilot.com/review/people.io  
182 See https://www.datum.org  
183 See https://itsmydata.de/?lang=en  
184 See https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/digitec/start-up-it-s-my-data-moechte-die-demokratisierung-der-daten-
16328619.html  
185 See https://wibson.org  
186 See https://medium.com/wibson/wibson-update-01-03-2020-352e9a422438  
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are either very low or not being paid out yet. This is also in line with the game-theoretical model 
by Haberer, Krämer and Schnurr (2019)188 who show that the incumbent platform will strategically 
react to the emergence of PDBs by adapting the quality of its online service. In cases where the 
PDB is a relatively weak competitor on the data market (i.e. the PDB is not very successful in 
monetising user data on the data market), the PDB is either foreclosed by the incumbent, or will 
only be able to pay out a minimal reward. Overall consumer welfare will decrease in this range, 
because the incumbent platform reduces its quality in order to deter the PDB. Consumer benefit 
only if the PDB is a relatively strong competitor (i.e. is very successful in monetising user data). In 
this case, the PDB pays users a positive and significant reward. However, in this case the platform 
will also start to charge users for access and not offer its service for ‘free’ anymore. In this way, 
the platform can appropriate some of the additional consumer surplus that was created by the 
PDB. This highlights that PDBs may well change the business model of incumbent platforms from a 
free (e.g., advertising based) to a paid (e.g., subscription based) business model.  
 
Moreover, paying users for their data also gives rise to an ethical issue. Such practice would 
quickly reveal that the data of some users is more valuable than the data of others. Even worse, 
the ‘valuable users’ are likely to be the most economically advantaged anyway. One interesting 
feature of the current zero-price (ad funded) business models in the digital economy is that 
everyone can access the same services, irrespective of how valuable their own data actually is. 
PDBs could change that and indeed, some low value users might find they have to start paying for 
services that were previously ‘free’, whilst high value users get paid to use them. 
 
Relatedly, Bergemann, Bonatti and Gan (2020)189 as well as Acemoglu et al (2019)190 highlight the 
‘social dimension’ of data, which reduces the value and monetary compensation for individual data 
points. Their argument is that data revealed by one individual also reveals information about other, 
similar individuals. This creates a data externality. When similar users have already revealed data 
to a data intermediary (a platform, or a PIMS), then the value of additional data by similar users is 
lower. This leads to an unravelling, whereby consumers with the lowest privacy preferences sell 
their data first, so that the data intermediary can acquire (statistical) information about users at 
relatively little costs. This social externality of data fundamentally undermines the idea that ‘data 
ownership’ of one sort or another actually empowers consumers to receive a ‘fair’ and significant 
remuneration for their personal data. 
 
5.3.2 Generating revenue from data controllers  
An alternative way to generate revenues for PIMS is to offer online service providers a convenient 
tool by which they can be compliant to the seemingly complex and evolving legal frameworks that 
have been established by GDPR, CCPA, and others yet to come. In this case, the PIMS serves as 
compliance service, which is to the benefit of the user (who can exercise his or her rights 
conveniently) and of the online service provider (who does not have to worry about compliance).  
                                               
 
 
188 Haberer, B., Krämer, J., & Schnurr, D. (2018, August). Standing on the Shoulders of Web Giants: The Economic 
Effects of Personal Data Markets. Working Paper. Available at: 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1067/8e8c90d6fbf319eacc91cba9ab691845b1c2.pdf  
189 Bergemann, D., Bonatti, A., & Gan, T. (2020). The economics of social data. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 
No. 2203R. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548336 
190 Acemoglu, D., Makhdoumi, A., Malekian, A., & Ozdaglar, A. (2019). Too much data: Prices and inefficiencies in data 
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Such a business model is pursued, e.g., by Datawallet.191 Interestingly, Datawallet initially started 
out with the idea of a PDB in the sense discussed above. However, the company recently shifted 
focus and now clearly advertises itself as a compliance tool for service providers. The revenue 
model rests exclusively on charging service providers, but not on charging consumers. Nor do they 
seek to make money by selling user data on their own. 
 
It is unlikely, however, that this business model will attract the current data rich firms as 
customers. Large online platforms have sufficient scale to handle compliance with GDPR and CCPA 
on their own. Thus, the business model is clearly targeted at small and medium sized services and 
in this sense a welcomed addition to the data ecosystem. However, PIMS pursuing this business 
model will have little impact on the data ecosystem for personal data, because they do not exert 
competitive pressure on large data rich firms. This also means that this business model may well 
be sustainable, because it is unlikely that such PIMS are entering the ‘kill zone’.  
 
5.3.3 Generating revenues from users 
Some observers have noted (e.g., Section 4.3.3 of the Opinion of the German Data Ethics 
Commission (2020)192) that any business model that depends on generating revenues from profit 
maximising data controllers is problematic per se. PIMS should act in the best interest of 
consumers, and not in the best interest of those that handle or monetise consumers’ data. 
Business model, which collect a flat subscription fee from users, which does not rely on the type or 
amount of data handled by the PIMS, are therefore preferred. Evidently, the question is how 
sustainable this business model is. Especially, if PIMS rely on a common set of standards, and 
therefore entry costs are relatively low, competition between PIMS that rely only on a flat 
subscription fee from users is likely to be fierce. At the same time, PIMS should offer a secure and 
reliable architecture for controlling personal data, and should not see cost-cutting as their primary 
concern to stay in business. This tension may only be resolved by effectively limiting the number of 
PIMS available, e.g., through licensing.  
 
5.3.4 No revenue generation 
The preceding discussion highlighted that privately funded PIMS, which rely on revenue generation 
from users, from the data controllers or on the data markets, may either not be sustainable or not 
have a significant impact on the data ecosystem. This may give rise for governmental intervention 
or PIMS which are not financed privately. If PIMS are indeed seen as a central element to 
empowering users, state subsidised or even state-run PIMS may in fact be the only option to 
address this market failure.  
 
However, two potential caveats of state-run PIMS are worth mentioning here. First, the state is 
often a bad investor and innovator compared to private firms. This seems especially problematic in 
a highly dynamic and complex environment like the data economy. Second, it is not clear – from 
the perspective of the users – that the state is the better controller of personal data. In some 
jurisdictions, consumers may have larger distrust in the government handling their data than a 
                                               
 
 
191 See https://www.datawallet.com  
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private firm. Although there may be technical solutions to ensure that data indeed remains private, 
and cannot be intercepted by the state (e.g., through cryptographic means such as blockchain 
solutions), it is not clear whether this is indeed a convincing argument for non-experts. Moreover, 
in some jurisdictions, such as the US, consumers have heightened privacy rights vis-à-vis the state 
compared to their privacy rights vis-à-vis private firms. In the European Union this does not apply, 
however. 
 
A final option may be to rely on open-source, not-for-profit solutions for PIMS. It is not unlikely 
that such solutions may emerge, particularly when there are agreed-on standards on which such 
solutions can be built. Ongoing projects, such as the Data Transfer Project or Solid are indeed 
examples for such open-source not-for-profit solutions. But also in these case, policymakers may 
take a more active role in facilitating the emergence and use of such PIMS, for example by setting 
common standards or by reducing information asymmetries though audits. We will return to this 
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6. Increasing the effectiveness of data portability in the 
digital economy 
 
Having laid out the complex legal, technical and economic considerations that arise in the context 
of data portability, within and possibly beyond the current EU legal framework, we now collect the 
gathered insights and derive concrete policy recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of 
data portability in the digital economy. 
 
6.1 The issues 
 
The right to data portability has been in effect for just about two years, but to date empirical and 
theoretical research on its economic consequences is scant. In the previous Section, we have 
identified several issues but also possible solutions under the given legal framework, which give 
rise to a number of recommendations how data portability can be made more effective in the 
context of the digital economy. 
 
First, we highlighted that the collection of personal data is highly concentrated in the digital 
economy. The issue arises primarily with respect to observed data (tracking data, clickstream data, 
behavioural data) and to a lesser extent with volunteered data. Volunteered data also tends to be 
more static, whereas observed data has a more dynamic character, i.e. it is generated at a much 
higher rate. It is therefore primarily the access to observed data, which is seen problematic under 
the current legal regime. While we have made clear that observed data should be included in data 
portability requests, the static and infrequent nature of a data portability request often diminishes 
the usefulness of observed data for other applications. Here, a more dynamic and continuous data 
portability would be desirable to overcome this issue.  
 
Second, we have also argued that widespread data portability, including both volunteered 
and observed data, is likely to render digital markets more competitive and innovative. 
While there is a lack of empirical studies to back or refute this claim, we have argued that freeing 
personal data from organisational silos would enable more decentralised innovation, which could 
also occur more independently at the service and the analytics level. We have also argued that, 
due to inherent concentration in the collection of observed data, it is desirable to have competition 
rather at the level of inferred data and analytics, but not in the collection of data. Taken together, 
this provides a strong rationale to facilitate data portability of `raw’ user input data (i.e. both 
volunteered and observed), but not derived and inferred data, as much as possible. This will also 
likely require to educate consumers on their rights, to make the data available to them 
transparent, and to derive technical solutions (through PIMS or other means) so that data 
portability is just a click away.  
 
Third, there are numerous technical difficulties that arise from different standards and 
data formats that may be used following a data portability request. In particular, the 
sending provider must not adhere to a certain standard and can change it at any given point in 
time. We have described the various technical complexities in Section 3. These uncertainties 
regarding standards and their perseverance can make it very costly for the new provider to offer 
an interface to import data. In return, this means that more stringent and common standards for 
data portability are a key to ensuring that data is more widely imported and used. The provisions 
in GDPR, which merely call for a “structured, commonly used and machine-readable format” are 
not enough. If the same type of data (e.g., photos, videos, search logs) would be made available in 
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provide respective import adapters.  A more widespread availability of such adaptors and re-
usability of ported data would also raise the awareness among users and encourage them to port 
their data. The transfer could further be facilitated by PIMS, who could perform schema mappings 
between various services. 
 
Fourth, given the novelty of the right to data portability, firms also raise legal concerns that 
might arise when including data in data portability requests and when accepting data 
from other providers. This includes potential conflicts of rights, especially regarding the porting 
of data provided by the data subject on other data subjects (e.g., address books, or pictures in 
which other people are tagged). But legal concerns also arise with respect to liability issues, such 
as who is responsible if data is lost or modified in the transfer process. The White Paper on Data 
Portability by Facebook (2019)193 summarises these legal concerns well. As explained in Section 2, 
some of those concerns can be addressed with the current legal rules. However, in order to 
encourage that more is included under the scope of data portability and that firms are more willing 
to import data, especially in the context of the digital economy, more legal certainty and guidance 
would be welcomed. Moreover, there may be a role for regulatory testbed, where innovative start-
ups accepting ported data, could work more closely together with the privacy-regulator in order to 
develop legally sound and economically viable solutions. 
 
Fifth, we have highlighted that, from a technical perspective, PIMS are an important and 
welcomed addition to the data ecosystem. However, the existing offers are still in its infancy 
and we have also raised doubts that, from an economic perspective, PIMS may find a sustainable 
business model, especially if they are indeed acting as a neutral data broker. A minimum 
requirement to make PIMS feasible is to develop common standards and APIs through which PIMS 
can interact with the various services in a standardised and immediate way. 
 
Sixth, to date there is limited evidence that data portability is widely used. Rather, we 
think that the root of the problem lies in the evident chicken-and-egg problem. Not at least for 
the reasons given above, currently very few providers to indeed accept ported data from users. If 
data is imported, it is often not done via the data set that a user has exported following a data 
portability request, but rather through existing APIs or other workarounds. In reverse, this means 
there is a lack of use cases for consumers to exercise their right to data portability. We believe that 
more continuous and standardised data portability is key to overcoming this chicken-and-egg 
problem.  
 
Moreover, the experience from telecom markets (number portability) shows that portability 
became widely adopted when the consumer merely needs to give consent, but the (technical) 
details of exchange are deliberated by the sending and receiving data controllers directly according 
to some standardised process. The experience from other industries, foremost the Open Banking 
Order in the UK, highlights that third-parties often do see a value in importing data, and that data 
importing becomes more likely when standards are in place that allow for a continuous importing of 
data. In the case of Open Banking, after a slow start, there has been a continuous increase in both 
the number of third-parties accessing the available APIs as well as in the number of API calls being 
made.194  
                                               
 
 
193 Facebook (2019). Charting a Way Forward: Data Portability and Privacy (September 2019). Available at: 
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/data-portability-privacy-white-paper.pdf  
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Finally, it important to note that, even if data portability would be frictionless for consumers 
and providers, there may are also be good economic reasons not to import data, e.g., 
because they have not created this data themselves and therefore have difficulties to assess the 
quality of data. For example, it is often argued that it would be valuable to import reputation and 
product review data from another platform. Even if such data can be ported, it is questionable to 
what degree, say a positive review of a user on an e-commerce platform has economic value for an 
accommodation platform. Similarly, it will be very context specific, whether or not data in the 
provided granularity is useful. For example, even within the firms contributing to the Data Transfer 
Project, which already offers a relatively frictionless environment for data portability, as of March 
2020, Facebook (including Instagram) and Twitter only allow to export data (video and photos), 
but provide no adapter to import data.  
 
Taken together, we therefore see scope for improvement in three areas: (i) effective enforcement 
of the current legal framework, (ii) a new right for continuous data portability, tailored for the 
digital economy, and (iii) enabling PIMS through standards. We discuss each in turn. 
 
6.2 Effective enforcement and clear scope of data portability under GDPR and DCD 
 
A first set of recommendations entails effective enforcement and legal certainty on existing legal 
frameworks for data portability, particularly Article 20 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
The objective of the GDPR and Article 16 of the Digital Content Directive (DCD) is to facilitate a 
one-time switching of consumers between services. As explained in Section 2.2, both legal 
provisions are complementary and allow consumers to comprehensively port their personal and 
non-personal data when switching from one digital services provider to another. 
 
However, as we have highlighted throughout the report, in the context of fast-moving digital 
markets, the provisions of the GDPR and DCD may not be enough to actually achieve this purpose 
(see Section 4). Data porting under DCD requires to terminate the contract with the previous 
provider, and therefore does not allow for multi-homing in order to trying out new services. Since 
digital services are often experience goods, whose value is known to users after they have been 
used, consumers may be reluctant to invoke Article 16 DCD too often. Likewise, the scope of 
Article 20 GDPR regarding portability of observed data is not very clear, and will be clarified in 
future case proceedings. Moreover, there are several tensions arising from Article 20 with other 
provisions in the GDPR such as data minimisation (see Section 2.1.4), which would require 
clarification. This is especially the case in the context of the digital economy, where the collection 
of personal data is ubiquitous, and often occurs in the form of observed rather than volunteered 
data. This is particularly evident in the tracking of consumers behaviour across several websites 
(see Section 4.1.3.1). Taken together, this creates legal uncertainty not only for providers but also 








June 2020 – Making data Portability More Effective for The Digital Economy     78/101 
6.2.1 Legal certainty on the scope and trade-offs of data portability right 
 
Thus, a first priority for policymakers is to increase the legal certainty with regard to the scope 
and the limits of data portability under Article 20 GDPR. In the context of the digital 
economy, where data is always processed by automated means and every click is potentially 
recorded, the tensions between purpose limitation, data minimisation and data portability are 
particularly immanent. More guidance is needed on issues like: 
 To what extent exactly is observed data to be included in a data portability request? As laid 
out under Section 4.3, a wider scope of data portability, including both volunteered and 
observed data, is desirable to stimulate data-driven innovation outside the current silos and 
is covered by the GDPR according to the EDBP. 
 In particular, does observed data include location, tracking and clickstream data (before 
being analysed or refined)? If so, how much context to such clickstream data should and 
needs to be made available so that data subjects can truly assess the information content of 
that data (e.g., exactly which content was consumed, exactly which ads were clicked on)? 
What are objective legal, economic or technical reasons not to make location, tracking and 
clickstream data available? For example, are concerns about data security and about a 
possible loss of reputation due to data leakage or misuse at the end of the receiving data 
controller admissible? When exactly is technically infeasibility admissible as a defence for 
data rich firm in the digital economy? 
 Is there an obligation for data controllers to install measures and tools so that every data 
subject must make an explicit decision on whether they consent or dissent in case 
another data subject asks to port data that affects their data rights (e.g., if a photo is to 
be ported on which the data subject is tagged)? What about data subjects who do not have a 
contract with the data controller (but, e.g., a photo with their name tagged nevertheless 
exists with that data controller and is to be ported)? 
 If some portable data affects data rights of other data subjects (and some of those data 
subjects have dissented to porting), does this mean that no data can be ported, or must the 
data controller offer to port at least the portion of the data that does not affect data rights of 
other subjects? 
 
Some of these issues relate directly to the questions that data rich firms have raised (e.g., 
Facebook in their White Paper on “Data Portability and Privacy”195) when trying to move forward in 
the context of data portability. Legal clarity which is in line with the realities of the digital 
economies is needed so that Art. 20 GDPR, will be effective.  
 
We realise that at some point these questions can become so complex that a case-by-case 
analysis is necessary. In this case, it should be clear what are the main interests of the trade-offs 
and where firms and consumers can find legal guidance on the balancing of those trade-offs in a 
timely manner. In particular, in these cases, providers willing to facilitate data portability for 
consumers should be able to receive specific guidance by the privacy regulator in a cooperative 
approach. In this context, it is also worthwhile to discuss the use of sandbox-regulation, as it is 
                                               
 
 
195 See Egan, E. (2019). Egan, E. (2019). Charting a way forward: Data portability and privacy [White Paper]. 
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the case in Open Banking, in order to provide a safe-harbour under which data portability can be 
developed further. 
 
6.2.2 User-friendly transparency on data  
A second priority is that there should be more transparency about the categories and extent 
of personal data that firms in the digital economy hold about a certain data subject. This 
information should be readily available to users already before a formal access request (Article 
15(3) GDPR) or data portability request (Article 20 GDPR) is initiated. Data subjects already have 
these rights under Articles 12 and 15 GDPR, but currently there still seems to be, in some cases, a 
lack of transparency concerning the actual extent of data collection pertaining to each data subject 
(e.g., on the extent of tracking data).  
 
In our view, this information can be made more transparent and accessible to data subjects in the 
context of digital service providers, e.g., through the use an appropriate dashboard in the 
respective user’s privacy settings. To be clear, several large online platforms, including Google and 
Facebook, already provide comprehensive dashboards.196 Such dashboards could then also be used 
to consent to data portability requests of other data subjects for individual data categories. 
 
6.2.3 Effective monitoring and enforcement  
A third priority is that there should be an effective monitoring and enforcement of the 
existing provisions on data portability under GDPR. This requires first that the scope and the 
limits of these provisions are clear in the context of the digital economy (see first priority) and that 
users are well aware about the data that is available about them and can be ported (see second 
priority). Then, there should be an effective monitoring and enforcement of the: 
 timeliness in pursuing data portability requests relating to Article 12(3) GDPR, 
 completeness of data (volunteered and observed data) in data sets created for portability, 
 admissibility of technical feasibility constraints, 
 admissibility of fees for data portability requests, particularly in the context of repeated 
requests relating to Article 12(5) GDPR. 
 
6.3 Continuous Data Portability 
 
Data portability under the scope of Article 20 GDPR, when clarified and enforced effectively as 
recommended in Section 6.2, is a welcome and necessary step to empower consumers to exercise 
their privacy rights. In combination with Article 16 DCD, it should also facilitate switching from one 
digital service provider to another. However, we believe that one-off data portability according to 
Article 20 GDPR may not be sufficient to truly empower users in digital markets to foster 
competition and innovation. Often consumers want to try out a new service provider immediately, 
and that provider may be in need to cold start with the users’ data in order to offer an immediately 
appealing service. But the GDPR does not give the consumers the right to immediate and very 
frequent access to their data. Consumers may have to wait up to a month or longer to receive the 
portable data from their current provider, and may face constraints regarding the frequency of 
these requests. Moreover, often consumers do not want to immediately switch to a new provider 
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completely, but multi-home between providers first.197 In this case consumers may not switch if 
they have to terminate their contract with the other provider in order to exercise their right to data 
portability (as under Article 16 DCD), and also a much more frequent porting of data that was is 
provided by Article 20 GDPR would be desirable.  
 
6.3.1 Objectives and legal tools 
We believe that a more diverse data ecosystem is necessary and fruitful, where collection, analytics 
and monetisation of data are balanced across a number of stakeholders, each of whom is 
incentivised through a healthy state of competition in the respective area that it operates in and 
where innovation can spur, because (personal) data is freed from corporate silos if consumers 
consent to it (see Section 4).  
 
As we have highlighted in Section 4.1.3, some of the personal data generated by data rich firms in 
the digital economy will not be easy to replicate. The real advantage of many firms rich in personal 
data is that they can combine personal data from many different sources seamlessly and in real 
time in order to create detailed user profiles. A one-off data transfer with a delay of up to a month 
is not consistent with this reality.  
 
Moreover, there is currently a lack of standards and tools to enable data portability at the click of a 
button. However, as we have laid out in Section 3, in the context of the digital economy the 
technical barriers to establish such de-facto standards – albeit challenging – can be overcome and 
some tools, like the Data Transfer Project, are already demonstrating workable examples. 
 
Article 20 GDPR (as well as its complementing Article 16 DCD) was not intended for continuous 
(i.e. very frequent) data transfers which would empower users to port their data (particularly 
observed data) from one service to the various other services that they may be using in (near) 
real-time. Following the deliberations in this report, we believe that this would be necessary to 
empower users to stimulate competition and innovation.  
 
Moreover, many commentators agree that ex-post competition law is not the right instrument to 
address the data access and portability issues (see Section 2.4), especially if the purpose is to 
promote innovation (e.g., at the data analytics level) in general, and not to contest a specific 
market. The legal barriers to obtain data access under competition law are typically very high (for 
good reasons), interventions take a long time and, most importantly, competition law is not well-
suited to develop timely and effective remedies in the complex environments of digital markets 
(see inter alia, e.g., Crémer et al. 2019, Furman et al. 2019198, Feasey and Krämer 2019199). The 
advantage of data portability is that it can offer personal identifiable consumer level data. But its 
disadvantage is that only a relatively small fraction of consumers will ever port data, such that the 
data is not representative. Thus, data access requests under competition law (or some other legal 
framework) will continue to play a role in the future. 
  
                                               
 
 
197 In this sense also Crémer et al., 2019, p.82. 
198 Furman, J., Coyle, D., Fletcher, A., McAuley, D., & Marsden, P. (2019). Unlocking digital competition: Report of the 
digital competition expert panel. Report prepared for the Government of the United Kingdom, March. 
199 Feasey, R., Krämer, J. (2019). Implementing effective remedies for anti-competitive intermediation bias on 
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In summary, we therefore argue to investigate the need and feasibility of an new proportionate 
rule enabling consumers to transfer their personal data (as under Article 20 GDPR) and 
their non-personal data (as under Article 16 DCD) in a timely and frequent manner from 
their existing digital service provider to another provider, at any given point in time. This 
is what we refer to as ‘continuous data portability’.  
 
This is not an entirely new policy proposal. It relates immediately to the “Smart Data” initiative in 
the UK which, is initially focussed on regulated industries, beginning with the Open Banking, but 
also seeks to include digital markets in the future.200 Similar steps are being taking under the new 
Consumer Data Right (CDR) in Australia. The policy proposal also relates to the recently adopted 
European data strategy, who recognises that the “absence of technical tools and standards” makes 
the exercise of data portability burdensome.201 Indeed, even several of the largest tech firms 
recently expressed their efforts to give users more control over their data and privacy.202  
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg explicitly urged governments for more regulation, and identified 
data portability as one of four areas where such action should be taken.203 The envisioned 
regulation on continuous data portability would be a step in this direction. 
 
As there is a possibility that such regulation amplifies the legal and economic risks and trade-
offs inherent to data portability, it is key that the legal uncertainties raised in Section 6.2 are 
thoroughly addressed first. Moreover, in accordance with the proportionality principle, the 
obligation to implement and enable continuous data portability should only be applicable when its 
benefits are likely to exceed its costs.  
 
6.3.2 Guidelines for implementation 
First lessons for the implementation of such an extended right to data portability can be drawn 
from the Free Flow of Data Regulation (FFDR) and also from Open Banking. Like in the FFDR, as a 
first step, we propose a participatory, adaptative204 and soft approach in the first phase. Thus, 
the regulation could require the establishment of codes of conduct and agreements on 
common standards and APIs, including performance criteria for the availability of these. We 
suggest that the following points should be included in such guidelines in any case: 
 Consumers must be able give their consent on a fine-granular level regarding which data is 
to be transferred. All-or-nothing transfers are often not necessary, and would create more 
transaction costs, both technically (e.g., network load, space requirements) as well as 
economically (larger privacy concerns). They would also run counter the legal requirements 
of data minimisation under GDPR; firms shall not influence consent or disconsent by offering 
commercial incentives or disincentives.  
 






201 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66, p.10. 




204 Ctrl-Shift (2018), Data Mobility: The personal data portability growth opportunity for the UK economy, Report for 
the UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport; P. Alexiadis and A. de Streel (2020), Designing an EU 
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 Data should be able to be shared directly between firms, when the consumers have 
consented to this. Data portability should be possible without any additional infrastructure at 
the consumer end. However, this does not preclude the possibility that users employ PIMS to 
store data or to facilitate this process. 
 Relatedly, the nature and scope of the data ported should be very clearly communicated to 
consumers, in plain language; generally the scope of portable data should be the same as 
under Art. 20 GDPR. 
 The data transfer needs to be secure, minimising risks for data leakage to parties not 
involved in the transfer, data modification or loss of data. 
 Where possible open standards and protocols should be used, which are free to use and 
transparent for developers (Furman Report, 2019, pp.71-74). 
 APIs need to be available with a high reliability and performance. They should have the same 
performance and reliability as the interfaces that consumers otherwise use to interact with 
the digital service provider (as in the PSD2). 
 
Several options are possible for the policy process by which these guidelines are 
transformed into technical solutions, ranging from industry-led self- and co-regulation to a 
standardisation body with legal powers.   
  
We believe that the development of standards and codes of conduct should be industry-led 
through multi-stakeholder groups, as in the case of the FFDR. All parties involved should 
negotiate in good faith to achieve the best possible outcome in the interest of the consumer. Given 
the international nature of digital services and data standards, possibly, the development can be 
facilitated by independent international standard setting committees, such as the W3C. However, 
as such committees typically require unanimous decisions, it needs to be taken care that 
developments are not vetoed by single parties to protect their market power.205   
 
Ideally, the development of standards and technical solutions can be built on existing projects such 
as the Data Transfer Project or Solid. Of course, the devil is in the detail and implementing this 
involves challenges, as the implementation of PSD2/Open Banking or cloud-based services like 
IaaS and SaaS have shown. Given the demonstration project of DTP and Solid, there does not 
seem to be a compelling technical reason why this is not feasible in a wider context (see Section 
3). It is also to be expected that, once standards are defined and APIs are available, there will be a 
significant effort from the open-source community to provide import and export adapters between 
various services. There should be a timely deadline after which the progress and implementation 
status is evaluated by the Commission.  
 
If no sufficient progress has been made by means in establishing standards and operational 
interfaces within a specified period of time, there may be a need for stronger governmental 
intervention or guidelines to ensure progress is made and neutrality of interests are warranted. 
For example, in Open Banking the major banks were required to constitute an independent trustee 
to develop standards. In the case of PSD2, relatively detailed technical provisions were adopted by 
the Commission on the basis of the participatory work done at the European Banking Authority. 
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Similar case-by-case provisions are also done in Australian Consumer Data Right (CDR) 
initiative.206  
 
The ultimate option is to enact a public standards organisation to achieve this end. For example, 
the Australian government has given a legal mandate the Data Standards Body to develop 
standards for data access and portability.207 It works in close collaboration with the competition 
authority and the data protection authority.  
 
6.4 Enabling and Governing Personal Information Management Systems  
 
With a larger and continuous flow of personal data, facilitated by a right to continuously port data 
from large digital service providers, the role of Personal Information Management Systems 
(PIMS) is likely to become very important in practice. They could provide a centralised 
management of user’s privacy settings and consented data flows; ideally aggregating relevant 
information across the various digital services that the consumer is using, and being able to change 
settings across several services as needed. In this sense, it would provide a dashboard of 
dashboards for user’s privacy settings.  
 
We think that this point should not be underestimated, because it is crucial that consumers are 
aware of their given consents and exercise their rights, particularly if this is the basis on which 
data is being shared between firms. In order to facilitate this, a centralised consent management is 
seen as crucial, as otherwise recent empirical studies suggest that this may lead to a vertical 
integration of PIMS with large platforms208, which would run contrary to the intention of the PIMS 
being a neutral broker.  
 
In order to enable a centralised consent management, first additional standards for consent 
management need to be agreed over and beyond those needed for data transfers.209 
Here, the same guidelines and recommendations as for the standards development for data 
transfer (Section 6.3.2) should apply. In order to facilitate this process at an early stage, additional 
funding for research and development on secure, decentralised and scalable solutions for consent 
management (e.g., based on blockchain technology) could be made available.  
 
Second, as we have pointed out in Section 5, even if standards for data portability and consent 
management are developed and the policy recommendations under 6.2 and 6.3 are being pursued, 
PIMS may struggle to find a profitable and sustainable business model. Indeed, it is crucial 
that PIMS become and remain a neutral intermediary acting purely on the behalf of consumers. 
This also why it has been suggested, e.g., by the German Data Ethics Commission, that there 
should be regulatory guidelines on acceptable business models for PIMS, preferring, e.g., business 
models based on flat monthly fees for consumers. Again, we pointed out in Section 5 that we are 
doubtful that such a business model would be sustainable without further safeguards. Moreover, it 
raises the question whether PIMS should not be available free of charge to consumers, because 
                                               
 
 
206 See https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/consumer-data-right-cdr-0 
207 See https://consumerdatastandards.org.au 
208 See Marthews, A. and C. Tucker (2019), Privacy policy and competition, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/ES-12.04.19-Marthews-Tucker.pdf 
209 European Commission Services, An emerging offer of Personal Information Management Services: Current state of 
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otherwise, there would be a monthly price tag on consumers’ privacy management, which may not 
be in line with European privacy values.  
 
However, we also expect that if such standards are in place, there will be considerable 
development in open source communities, providing decentralised non-profit solutions. Given the 
potentially sensitive nature of the data being handled through PIMS, there may still be a need for 
public oversight, such as through privacy seals and certification.210 
 
To achieve critical mass for PIMS, a fruitful avenue may also be to build a user base on top of 
existing or developing identity management solutions. In particular, the European Commission is 
currently pushing national governments to offer an interoperable European identity management 
based on public national electronic identification (eIDs).211 Moreover, during the European Council 
Meeting held on 10th  March 2020, Heads of States and governments agreed to launch an initiative 
entitled European Digital Identity, “with the aim of developing an EU-wide digital identity that 
allows for a simple, trusted and secure public system for citizens to identify themselves in the 
digital space by 2027”. This could also be a starting point to couple identity management with 
consent management, and to link the eIDAS regulation to the Digital Services Act, which is 
expected in about the same time frame.  
 
  
                                               
 
 
210 European Commission Services, An emerging offer of Personal Information Management Services: Current state of 
service offers and challenges, November 2016, p.12. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
Personal data portability, in the form of GDPR Article 20, was an important first step in empowering 
users to take their data, volunteered or observed, to wherever and whoever they wished. This has 
also led to a wider movement among policy makers to support data mobility, which also includes 
portability of non-personal-data, more generally. Examples of this are the Digital Content Directive 
and the Free Flow of Data Directive.  
 
The specific impact of data portability, as currently implemented in the legal framework, is not 
clear as yet, since there is a lack of empirical studies on the topic. Nevertheless, what is already 
clear is that many data services do not yet offer import possibilities for ported data, and 
consequently, data portability in the legal sense is not used widely by consumers in the digital 
economy. Many commentators have argued that this is not actually a consequence of an inability 
to use data outside of the context where it was created. Rather, it is the result of a lack of common 
standards, and of APIs to access the data in a convenient and timely manner. In addition, it has 
raised legal issues over liability and protection of the rights of others.  
 
In this report, we argue that all of these issues can be overcome, albeit potentially requiring 
considerable effort. Regarding the legal issues, specific guidance should be offered on how data 
portability can be facilitated and which data is subject to data portability in the digital economy 
without violating privacy rights. In particular, we advocate that observed data should clearly be 
included under the scope of data portability, with a wide interpretation of observed data adopted, 
including clickstream and tracking data, if available. In order to make the inherent trade-offs 
salient and to be able to resolve them, an open and constructive dialogue between data-intensive 
firms in the digital economy and regulators is needed. Such a dialogue could evolve around 
prototypical use cases for data types to be transferred, such as posts, videos, photos, search logs, 
clickstreams, geo-location or ad views. Eventually, data portability is also likely to require the 
collection of explicit consent from consumers on requests initiated by others that include their 
personal data and - in some cases – greater transparency over the personal data available for 
porting.  
 
In addition, we also argue that continuous data portability, facilitated by common data standards 
and APIs, is technically feasible, albeit challenging. In fact, many providers already have such APIs 
in place, either privately or publicly accessible, often with considerable technical or commercial 
constraints. Moreover, demonstration projects, such as the Data Transfer Project, have highlighted 
that continuous data portability is technically feasible. We therefore consider it essential that, 
within the scope of digital markets, the obligation to offer standardised APIs to enable consumers 
to continuously port their data should be much more widespread. This approach echoes ongoing 
policies in the UK and Australia, and we believe that the European Commission, in its Digital 
Strategy, should follow suit. We believe that standardised APIs that enable continuous data 
portability are a prerequisite for encouraging more organisations to import personal data, and for 
encouraging more consumers to initiate such transfers. Ultimately, this is likely to spur innovation 
and competition in digital markets, although it is unlikely to disrupt existing market structures. 
Indeed, any such obligation must always bear in mind a proportionality principle; it should not be 
overly burdensome for small and emerging digital service providers.  
 
Finally, we believe that Personal Management Information Systems (PIMSs) will have a crucial role 
to play in a digital economy where data portability is widely adopted. In particular, a PIMS should 
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and controlling the flow of their personal data. Data portability must be as straightforward as 
possible in order not to overwhelm consumers with choices that may ultimately prevent them from 
exercising their rights. This may well require educating and informing users on their rights through 
information campaigns running alongside the policy measures proposed here.  
 
Moreover, we are sceptical that PIMSs can be economically self-sustaining and can find a business 
model where they can be a truly neutral agent that acts purely on behalf of the consumer. We 
suggest two avenues where a PIMS could be developed. First, standards for consent management 
could be established that will enable PIMSs to access and control the privacy settings in various 
services. Combined with appropriate certification, this could drive open-source solutions. Second, 
the EU could take a more active role by coupling development of its consent standards more 
closely to its ongoing efforts for a joint European identity management solution.  
 
The proposed measures are likely to be a tedious but essential step in making data portability 
more effective and thus harnessing its true potential for competition, innovation and empowering 
users. We believe that the time to act is now. There should be no second guessing on how to make 
data portability more effective. All the measures proposed are aimed at empowering users, not 
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Annex I: Draft Codes of Conduct for Data Portability and 
Cloud Service Switching 
 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
 
The Draft Code of Conduct for Data Portability and Cloud Service Switching for 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provides that:212  
 
- The cloud service shall be capable of importing and exporting Cloud Service Customer (CSC) 
Infrastructure Artefacts, in an easy and secure way, supporting the following scenarios: CSC to 
cloud service, cloud service to cloud service and cloud service to CSC. The Infrastructure Cloud 
Provider (Infra. CSP) shall provide the support to enable the transfer of Infrastructure Artefacts 
using structured, commonly used, machine readable format. 
 
- When exporting CSC Infrastructure Artefacts from a CSC to a cloud service, or between cloud 
services, the Infra. CSP should provide support to facilitate the interoperability between the 
CSC's capabilities including the user function, administrator function and business function5 
related to the cloud service. 
 
- The Infra. CSP should provide Application Programming Interfaces related to the cloud service 
and, if provided, they shall be fully documented. These APIs should enable the transfer of 
Infrastructure Artefacts between participating parties. If there are any associated code libraries 
or dependencies they should be documented and made available. 
 
- The cloud service is not required under this Code to transform the CSC Infrastructure Artefacts 
where the destination environment requires the Infrastructure Artefacts to be in different 
formats than that offered by the source environment. Parties may agree otherwise in the CSA. 
 
- Transfer of CSC Infrastructure Artefacts to and from the cloud service should use open standards 
and open protocols for Infrastructure Artefacts movement. 
 
- Where the CSC data involves Infrastructure Artefacts that rely on a feature or capability of the 
cloud service, the Infra. CSP shall provide an appropriate description of the environment for 
their execution and how the service dependencies can be satisfied. 
 
- The Infra. CSP should provide a self-service interface that enables the CSC to carry out periodic 
retrieval of the CSC’s data. This functionality can be subject to contract and may include 
additional costs. 
 
- The Infra. CSP shall take reasonable steps to enable a CSC to maintain their service continuity 
while transferring data between providers, where technically feasible. 
 
The same draft Code of Conduct Switching and Portability of data related to Software as a Service 
proposes the following requirement for data export:213 
 
3.2.1. The source CSP shall have and specify an explicit and structured process for data export. 
The source CSP should include data management considerations (e.g. snapshots and incremental 
approaches, records management policies and procedures, bandwidth assessment) and any 
relevant timescales, notice requirements, customer contact procedures (contact points, 
escalation etc) and impact on service continuity. This should include relevant SLO and SQO from 
                                               
 
 
212 Draft Code of Conduct of 22 November 2019 of WIPO for Data Portability and Cloud Service Switching for 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Cloud services, v. 2.9, art. 5.2.. 
213 Draft Code of Conduct of November 2019 of WIPO on Switching and Portability of data related to Software as a 
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the SLA. The process and documentation shall cover technical, contractual and licensing matters 
such that they are sufficient to enable porting and switching. 
 
3.2.2. The source CSP shall specify any CSP imposed or enforced obligations on CSCs before 
exporting data can commence. (i.e. any action required of the CSC to implement the source 
CSP’s processes for data portability as specified in 3.2.1, shall be part of the CSP transparency 
statement). 
 
3.2.3. The source CSP shall specify any known post contractual license fees or other liabilities, 
for example patent and licensing fees covering use of derived data or data formats or claims and 
cases that are ongoing. 
 
3.2.4. The source CSP shall specify any tools and services incurring additional fees for data 
export that are required by the source CSP processes for data portability as specified in 3.2.1. 
 
3.2.5. The source CSP shall specify any source CSP provided tools or services (including for 
example addressing integration or interoperability support) that are available to assist the export 
process and any fees associated with those tools. The source CSP may specify any 3rd party 
tools or services. 
 
3.2.6. The source CSP shall specify whether or not the source CSP’s processes for data 
portability as specified in 3.2.1. allow a CSC to be completely autonomous in exporting data i.e. 
when the CSC does not need human interaction with the CSP. 
 
3.2.7. The source CSP shall specify which data, including derived data (e.g. computed field 
values, graphics, visualizations) can be exported from the service prior to the effective export 
date. 
 
3.2.8. The source CSP shall specify what, if any, security audit related data (e.g. access logs) is 
available for export (e.g. logs of user interactions with the cloud service that could be needed for 
security analysis and for supervisory request). 
 
3.2.9. The source CSP shall specify which data standards, formats and/or file types are 
recommended, used or available for data exporting (e.g. binary, MIME, CSV, SQL, JSON, XML, 
Avro) for each and every data set available for export including any unstructured data. 
 
3.2.10. The source CSP shall provide documentation on the format and structure of the exported 
data including where it can be sourced and under what terms if from a 3rd party source 
(including open or industry standard formats or exchanges (e.g. Open Financial Exchange 
format). As per 3.2.1 above this must be sufficient to enable porting and switching. 
 
3.2.11. The source CSP shall specify what cryptographic processes and services it provides, if 
any, during data export (including unencrypted options) and how encryption keys are managed. 
The process shall allow the CSC to decrypt the exported Data. 
 
3.2.12. The source CSP shall specify any security controls (e.g. access controls) available during 
data export. 
 
3.2.13. The source CSP shall specify any access to, retention period and deletion processes 
(including notification of deletion) of data, including differing categories of data (including 
derived data and management data) after the expiration of contract. 
 
3.2.14. The source CSP shall specify the costs structure for data export and related procedures. 
 
3.2.15. The source CSP shall specify any processes that it supports to maintain data integrity, 
service continuity and prevention of data loss specific to data exporting (e.g. pre and post 
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3.2.16. The source CSP shall specify the available mechanisms, protocols and interfaces that can 
be used to perform data export (e.g. VPN LAN to LAN, Data Power, SFTP, HTTPS, API, physical 
media…) 
 
3.2.17. The Source CSP shall specify any dependencies between the data available for export 
and other data connected to another cloud service that are created unilaterally by the source 
CSP and that are not under control of the CSC. 
 
3.2.18. The source CSP shall specify any processes, as part of the precontractual transparency 
document, to disclose use of subcontractors during data portability activity. 
 
Software as a Service (SaaS) 
 
The draft Code of Conduct Switching and Portability of data related to Software as a 
Service (SaaS) proposes the following requirement for data import:214 
 
3.3.1. The destination CSP shall have and specify an explicit and structured process for data 
import. The destination CSP should include data management considerations (e.g. snapshots and 
incremental approaches, records management policies and procedures, bandwidth assessment) 
and any relevant timescales, notice requirements and customer contact procedures (contact 
points, escalation etc) and impact on service continuity. The process and documentation shall 
cover technical, contractual and licensing matters such that they are sufficient to enable porting 
and switching. 
 
3.3.2. The destination CSP shall specify any CSP-imposed or enforced obligations on customers 
before importing data. (i.e. any action required of the CSC to implement the destination CSP 
processes for data portability as specified in 3.3.1 shall be part of the CSP transparency 
statement). 
 
3.3.3. The destination CSP shall specify any tools incurring additional fees for data import that 
are required by the destination CSP processes for data portability as specified in 3.2.1. 
 
3.3.4. The destination CSP shall specify any CSP provided tools or services (including for 
example addressing integration or interoperability support) that are available to assist the import 
process and any fees that are associated with those tools or services. The CSP may specify any 
3rd party tools or services. 
 
3.3.5. The destination CSP shall specify whether or not the customer can be completely 
autonomous in importing data i.e. when the CSC does not need human interaction with the CSP. 
 
3.3.6. The destination CSP shall specify which data, including any derived data from a source 
exporting service (e.g. computed field values, graphics, visualizations) can be imported into the 
service. 
 
3.3.7. The destination CSP shall specify what, if any, security audit related data can be imported 
(e.g. logs of user interactions with the cloud service that could be needed for security analysis 
and for supervisory request). 
 
3.3.8. The destination CSP shall specify which data standards, formats and/or file types are 
recommended, used or available for data importing (e.g. binary, MIME, CSV, SQL, JSON, XML, 
Avro) for each and every data set available for import including any unstructured data. 
 
3.3.9. The destination CSP shall specify the format/structure required of imported data and 
where definitions are available and under what terms (including open or industry standard 
formats or exchanges (e.g. Open Financial Exchange format). The CSP should specify any 
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available validators and if so what type (e.g. structure, format, storage type, volume, links), 
from where and under what terms. As per 3.3.1 above this must be sufficient to enable porting 
and switching. 
 
3.3.10. The destination CSP shall specify what encryption processes are used during data import 
(including unencrypted options) and how encryption keys are managed 
 
3.3.11. The destination CSP shall specify any security controls (e.g. access controls) used during 
data import. 
 
3.3.12. The destination CSP shall specify the costs structure for data import and related 
procedures (e.g. volume restrictions). 
 
3.3.13. The destination CSP shall specify any processes that it supports to maintain data 
integrity, service continuity and prevention of data loss specific to data importing (e.g. pre and 
post transfer data back-up and verification, freeze periods and secure transmission and roll back 
functionality). 
 
3.3.14. The destination CSP shall specify the available mechanisms, protocols and interfaces that 
can be used to perform data import (e.g. VPN LAN to LAN, Data Power, SFTP, HTTPS, API, 
physical media …) 
 
3.3.15. The destination CSP shall specify any processes, as part of the precontractual 







June 2020 – Making data Portability More Effective for The Digital Economy     102/101 
 
 
 
